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Abstract
The increased complexity and ubiquity of cyber-physical systems in recent
times demands for more efficient and cost effective techniques to analyze
software and hardware correctness, as well as to assess their performance
at a given time in the future. Two disciplines that deal with these aspects
of system development are verification and performance evaluation. During
this thesis work we focused in methods for improving quality in both of these
areas in the context of railway safety-critical domain.
Verifying a system means to prove or disprove that the system is the
correct implementation of a specification, often expressed as a collection of
properties – the Requirements – written in a given language. In the railway
safety-critical domain the requirements play a key role in the product lifecy-
cle as the system is developed and verified according to them; they are often
expressed in natural language – which is flexible, but inherently ambiguous
– albeit the strong needs of clearness and precision of the context. The re-
quirements have to abide to strict quality criteria and the requirement review
is therefore a very important activity to indentify quality defects and it is
traditionally performed manually. Rule-based natural language processing
(NLP) techniques have been developed to automatically perform this task.
However, the literature is lacking empirical studies on the application of
these techniques in industrial settings. This thesis mainly focuses on inves-
tigating to which extent NLP can be practically applied to detect defects in
the requirements documents of a railway signalling manufacturer. The con-
tribution is in carrying out one of the first works in which NLP techniques
for defect detection are applied on a large set of industrial requirements
annotated by domain experts. We contribute with a comparison between
traditional manual techniques used in industry for requirements analysis,
and analysis performed with NLP. Our experience shows that several dis-
crepancies can be observed between the two approaches. The analysis of the
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discrepancies offers hints to improve the capabilities of NLP techniques with
company specific solutions, and suggests that also company practices need
to be modified to effectively exploit NLP tools.
For what concerns the performance evaluation area we had the opportu-
nity to focus on the system availability in the context of a different project of
the laboratory. With the increased city population, the integration of public
and private transport flows introduces new challenges, especially in urban
transport. As it is often the case in scientific and engineering problems, the
object of study is a model of the system, rather than the system itself. We
provide one modeling and analysis method using stochastic Time Petri Nets
for those city intersections where public and private transport flows integra-
tion is often cause of traffic congestion leading to train delays and even run
deletion. The use of the STPN instead of simulation techniques provides
a more effective way to set timing for traffic lights and train timetables in
order to improve system availability.
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Introduction
The objective
The increased complexity and ubiquity of cyber-physical systems in recent
times demand more efficient and cost effective techniques to analyze software
and hardware correctness, as well as to assess their performance at a given
time in the future. Two disciplines that deal with these aspects of system
development are verification and performance evaluation. During this thesis
work we focused in methods for improving quality in both of these areas in
the context of railway safety-critical domain.
Verification
For what concerns the verification, the author cooperated with Alstom Fer-
roviaria S.p.A., a major manufacturer in the railway domain, and with the
Formal Methods and Tools Lab of the ISTI institute of CNR.
Context and motivation
Verifying a system means to prove or disprove that the system is the correct
implementation of a specification, often expressed as a collection of proper-
ties – the Requirements – written in a given language. In the railway safety-
critical domain the requirements play a key role in the product lifecycle as the
system is developed and verified according to them. Albeit the strong needs
of clearness and precision of the context, they are often expressed in natural
language [37, 87] – which is flexible, yet inherently ambiguous – and they
are progressively refined along the development process. All the requirement
documents have to abide to strict quality criteria and the requirement review
is therefore a crucial activity to identify quality defects and it is traditionally
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performed manually, thus it is time consuming and error prone. Rule-based
Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques [117, 12, 62, 61, 111, 6, 46]
have been developed to automatically perform this task. However, the lit-
erature is lacking empirical studies on the application of these techniques in
industrial settings.
Goal and contribution
Our goal consisted in investigating to which extent NLP can be practically
applied to detect defects in the requirements documents of a railway sig-
nalling system.
To address it we first identified a set of typical defects classes and, for each
class, an engineer of the company implemented a set of defect-detection
patterns by means of the GATE tool for text processing [35]. After a pre-
liminary analysis, we applied the patterns to a large set of 1866 requirements
previously annotated for defects. The output of the patterns was further in-
spected by two domain experts to check the false positive cases. Additional
discard-patterns were defined to automatically remove these cases. Finally,
SREE [111], a tool that searches for typically ambiguous terms, was applied
to the requirements. The experiments show that SREE and our patterns
may play complementary roles in the detection of requirements defects. We
applied NLP techniques for defect detection on a large set of industrial re-
quirements annotated by domain experts. The contribution consists in a
comparison between traditional manual techniques used in industry for re-
quirements analysis, and analysis performed with NLP. Our experience tells
that several discrepancies can be observed between the two approaches. The
analysis of the discrepancies offers hints to improve the capabilities of NLP
techniques with company specific solutions, and suggests that also company
practices need to be modified to actively exploit NLP tools.
Performance evaluation
For what concerns the performance evaluation, the author had the oppor-
tunity to focus on a research application of the system availability attribute
in the context of a different project (funded by the Fondazione Cassa di
Risparmio di Firenze) of the laboratory.
3Context and motivation
With the increased city population, the integration of public and private
transport flows introduces new challenges; Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems (ITS) for urban mobility aim at the grand objective of reducing envi-
ronmental impact and minimize urban congestion, also integrating different
mobility modes and solutions [41, 1]. However, the different transportation
modalities may end in a conflict due to physical constraints concerned with
the urban structure itself: an example is the case of intersection between a
public road and a tramway right-of-way, where traffic lights priority given to
trams may trigger road congestion, while an intense car traffic can impact
on trams’ performance. These situations can be anticipated and avoided by
accurately modeling and analyzing the possible congestion events. Typically,
modeling tools provide simulation facilities, by which various scenarios can
be played to understand the response of the intersection to different traf-
fic loads. While supporting early verification of design choices, simulation
encounters difficulties in the evaluation of rare events. Only modeling tech-
niques and tools that support the analysis of the complete space of possible
scenarios are able to find out such rare events [20, 14].
Goal and contribution
Our goal consisted in the implementation and evaluation of an analytical ap-
proach to model and evaluate a critical intersection for the Florence tramway,
where frequent traffic blocks used to happen. Specifically, we exploited the
ORIS tool to evaluate the probability of a traffic block, leveraging regen-
erative transient analysis based on the method of stochastic state classes
to analyze a model of the intersection specified through Stochastic Time
Petri Nets (STPNs). This experience shows that the frequency of tram rides
impacts on the road congestion, and hence compensating measures (such as
sychronizing the passage of trams in opposite directions on the road crossing)
should be considered.
Thesis organization
The present thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 1 describes the context in which this thesis sits with an in-
troduction on safety-critical systems and the description of norms and
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product life cycle in the railway domain;
• Chapter 2 introduces the problem of ambiguity in natural language
providing the evaluation measures used in the following chapters;
• Chapter 3 is dedicated to the defect detection approaches and after
the literature review describes the rule-based approach used in our
reported case-study to detect ambiguity in requirements expressed in
natural language;
• Chapter 4 explains the research methodology and the case-study de-
sign, presenting the Research Questions and the adopted procedures;
• Chapter 5 describes the execution of the case study, focusing on the
involved subjects, the used dataset, and the iterations performed in
order to answer the Research Questions;
• Chapter 6 presents the results obtained through the case study execu-
tion and provides the answers to the Research Questions;
• Chapter 7 highlights the lessons learned and the return of experience,
and presents the implication for practice and future work directions;
• Chapter 8 describes the problem of performance evaluation of public
urban transport. The model of an intersection between public trans-
port and private traffic is provided and analyzed by using Stochastic
Time Petri Nets (STPNs);
• Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 1
Safety-Critical Systems and
their Development Process
1.1 Introduction
Part of this thesis work has been carried out with the collaboration of Alstom,
a leading railway signalling systems manufacturer. The author was involved
in the development product life cycle of hardware and software products
for real railway systems. This experience oriented the research work for
the thesis creating a basis for the author’s interest in the area of quality and
cost-effectiveness improvement in the development life cycle of such systems.
The exercise of Safety-Critical systems involves a critical level of risk of
exposure for people, environment and material assets to dangerous situations
with the possibility of accidents due to malfunctions caused by errors or
failures [25, 26, 24]. No system can be defined “absolutely safe”, thus safety
is the absence of unacceptable levels of risk [25], or even the property of a
system to not cause harm to human life or to the environment. [104]. The
choice of an appropriate risk management approach defines a reasonable
probability for risks considered acceptable (THR, Tolerable Hazard Rate)
in the operational conditions in which the system works. It is therefore
important to ensure before commissioning that the probability of risky events
caused by the system is lower than THR. The assessment that the system
meets all the required conditions is carried out according to standards that, in
the European railway domain, are provided by CENELEC (Comite´ Europe´en
de Normalization en E´lectronique et en E´lectrotechnique). These standards
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have been also prescribed since 2002 by RFI (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana) as
a reference for the safety certification of products and electronic systems in
railway signalling. Some of these standards are listed below:
• EN-50126 [25]: Railway applications - The specification and demon-
stration of dependability, reliability, availability, maintainability and
safety (RAMS);
• EN-50129 [24]: Railway applications - Safety related electronic sys-
tems;
• EN-50128 [26]: Railway applications - Software for railway control
and protection systems;
• EN-50159 [27]: Railway applications - Communication, signalling
and processing systems - Part 1: Safety related communication in
closed transmission systems.
Figure 1.1: Scope of CENELEC norms.
Figure 1.1 shows the relations among the listed standards. The horizontal
axis represents the progression from the most general to the most specific
one, while the vertical axis represents the scope each standard has.
1.2 Dependability attributes
Dependability is defined as the property of a system to be usable by an
human being, or a community, without the danger of unacceptable risks [80].
The development of safety-critical systems and their verification is oriented
to fulfill the dependability requirements.
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Dependability includes the following attributes:
• Reliability: the ability of a system to perform a required function
under certain conditions and for a specified period of time;
• Availability: the ability of a system to perform a required function
at a certain time or in a specified time interval, given the necessary
resources;
• Maintainability: probability that for a given system unit during a
certain time interval is carried out a given active maintenance activity,
implemented through procedures and required means;
• Safety: absence of unacceptable levels of risk of harm.
These attributes are often referred with the acronym of RAMS (Relia-
bility, Availability, Maintainability and Safety); they guide the design and
implementation of the system and are used as a reference when evaluating
the model itself.
The development process that aims at fulfilling each attribute at the
requested level is composed by several phases shown in Figure 1.2 [91, 25].
Figure 1.3 shows the involved actors and their role in the process.
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability can be quantifiable by direct
measurements while Safety is a subjective assessment that requires judg-
mental informations to be applied to give a level of confidence. In order to
discuss the Safety attribute, we first need to specify what we mean for risk.
A risk is strictly related to an hazard (i.e., an event that can lead to an
accident). It is defined as the combination of the frequency of occurrence
of the hazard and its severity. The frequency of occurrence, based on the
event probability, is classified by levels, ranging from Incredible to Frequent.
The hazard severity, based on the consequences for people and environment,
is classified by levels, ranging from Insignificant to Catastrophic. The com-
bination of frequency and severity levels generates a set of risk classes. To
each risk class is associated an index, the Risk Class Index (RCI), ranging
from Negligible to Intolerable. Table 1.1 shows an example of risk acceptance
evaluation.
On the basis of the previous analysis, each part of the system is then
classified on the basis of its criticality level. The parameter used is called
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) which varies from 0 (for systems or subsystems
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Figure 1.3: Safety actors.
with no critical features) to 4 (for systems or subsystems with high risk
level). Each SIL class is associated with two factors:
• a range of values for the THR (see Table 1.2);
• a set of actions to be performed during the life cycle process.
1.3 The software development life cycle
Among the norms that are part of the CENELEC standards, EN-50128 is the
one that specifies the procedures and technical requirements for the develop-
ment of programmable electronic systems for the usage in railway control and
protection applications. This norm applies within the scope of the software
(e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications) and its interaction with the
system. EN-50128 describes the software lifecycle from the specification, to
the development and finally the verification and validation phases.
It also specifies some basic principles in the development of safe software
as the ones listed below:
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Occasional Tolerable Undesiderable Undesiderable Intolerable
Remote Negligible Tolerable Undesiderable Undesiderable
Improbable Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Incredible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Severity Levels of Hazard Consequence
Table 1.1: Example of risk acceptance evaluation.
THR SIL
10−9 ≤ THR < 10−8 4
10−8 ≤ THR < 10−7 3
10−7 ≤ THR < 10−6 2
10−6 ≤ THR < 10−5 1
10−5 ≤ THR 0
Table 1.2: Relation between THR and SIL defined in EN50129 [24].
• software must be developed using modular programming technique1;
• verification activities performed at each stage of the development life
cycle;
• all of the used libraries and modules must be verified;
• drawing up of clear documentation.
The phase of system verification is a key step and it is driven by re-
quirements and it aims at demonstrating that the system is their correct
implementation.
The norm recommends for the development process the use of the V
Model (shown in Figure 1.4) [26].
The V Model is a graphical representation of the development lifecycle
of a system. It is used to produce rigorous development lifecycle models and
project management models.
1Modular programming is a software design technique that emphasizes separating the
functionality of a programme into independent, interchangeable modules, such that each
contains everything necessary to execute only one aspect of the desired functionality.
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Figure 1.4: Development process using the V Model cycle.
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The norm describes the activities to be performed at each step and the
deliverables that have to be produced in output. The activities performed in
all phases in the left side are verified in the corresponding phases placed at the
same level in the opposite branch of the V. The left side of the V represents
the decomposition of requirements, and creation of system specifications.
The right side of the V represents integration of parts and their validation.
However, Requirements need to be validated first against the higher level
requirements or user needs. Below is a list and brief explanation of the
represented phases in terms of the action taken by different roles played in
the development cycle, namely the Requirement Engineer, the Developer, the
Verification Engineer, the Validation Engineer and the External Assessor.
According to EN-50128 [26], the roles have to be played by different actors
for software rated at the highest SIL.
Software Requirements Specification Phase: inputs of this phase are the
System Requirements Specification, System Safety Requirements Specifica-
tion, System Architecture Description and System Safety Plan. During this
phase the following activities are performed:
• The Requirement Engineer provides Software Requirements Specifica-
tion that shall describe the system as a single entity, formalizing the
macro-level actions and features that it shall provide and the con-
straints that it shall guarantee;
• The Verification Engineer takes as input Software Requirements Spec-
ification and provides the Test Cases, in the form of Software Require-
ments Test Specification, needed to verify the software at the corre-
sponding level of detail;
• The Validation Engineer takes as input all artifacts mentioned in the
current step, validates that the Software Requirements Specification
has taken into account all requirements defined at higher level, and
validates that Software Requirements Test Specification correctly cov-
ers the Software Requirements Specification by producing the Software
Requirements Verification Report.
Software Architecture and Design Phase: inputs of this phase are arti-
facts produced during the previous phase. During this phase the following
activities are performed:
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• The Requirement Engineer provides Software Architecture Specification
that shall describe architectural blocks composing the system. Specific
actions and features are specified for each block;
• The Requirement Engineer provides Software Design Specification as
specification of each block that shall be designed in order to provide
the requested functionalities and all those interfaces required for infor-
mation propagation between different blocks. Different Requirement
Engineers can be responsible for different phases;
• The Verification Engineer takes as input Software Design Specification
and provides the Test Cases, in the form of Software Design Test Spec-
ification, needed to verify the software at the corresponding level of
detail;
• The Validation Engineer takes as input all of the mentioned artifacts in
the current step, validates that the Software Architecture Specification
has taken into account all requirements defined in Software Require-
ments Specification, validates that the Software Design Specification
has taken into account all requirements defined in Software Architec-
ture Specification and validates that Software Design Test Specifica-
tion correctly covers the Software Design Specification by producing
the Software Architecture and Design Verification Report.
Software Component Design Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts pro-
duced during the previous phase. During this phase the following activities
are performed:
• The Requirement Engineer provides Software Component Design Spec-
ification as specification of each component that is derived from Ar-
chitecture and Design Phase; a component is defined as a stand-alone
compilation unit and thus corresponds to a single source code file;
• The Verification Engineer takes as input Software Component Design
Specification and provides the Test Cases, in the form of Software Com-
ponent Test Specification, needed to verify the software at the corre-
sponding level of detail;
• The Validation Engineer takes as input all artifacts mentioned in the
current step, validates that the Software Component Design Specifica-
tion has taken into account all requirements defined in Software Design
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Specification and validates that Software Component Test Specification
correctly covers the Software Component Design Specification by pro-
ducing the Software Component Verification Report.
Code Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts produced during the pre-
vious phase. During this phase the following activities are performed:
• The Developer provides the implementation of the requested software
system, or of a portion of it, according to the provided requirements,
thus producing Software Source Code and Supporting Documentation;
• The Verification Engineer takes as input Software Source Code and
Supporting Documentation and verifies the Software Source Code com-
pliance against the planned Source Code verification activities and pro-
vides the Software Source Code Verification Report.
Software Component Testing Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts pro-
duced during the previous phase and in Software Component Design Phase.
During this phase the following activity is performed:
• The Verification Engineer executes all Test Cases contained in Software
Component Test Specification and produces the Software Component
Test Report.
Software Integration Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts produced
during the previous phase and in Software Architecture and Design Phase.
During this phase the following activity is performed:
• The Verification Engineer verifies the capability of the Software Source
Code to execute on the System Hardware and produces the Software
Integration Test Report.
Software/Hardware Integration Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts
produced during the previous phase. During this phase the following activity
is performed:
• The Verification Engineer executes all Test Cases contained in Software
Design Test Specification and produces Software/Hardware Integration
Test Report.
Software Validation Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts produced
during the previous phase and in Software Requirement Specification Phase.
During this phase the following activity is performed:
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• The Validation Engineer validates that all test cases have been exe-
cuted by Verification Engineer and that they all had positive result,
thus providing the Software Validation Report.
Software Assessment Phase: inputs of this phase are artifacts produced
during all the phases. During this phase the following activity is performed:
• The External Assessor, upon revision of all produced artifacts, certifies
that the Software has been developed according to what is required by
the applicable CENELEC norms and provides the Software Assessment
Report.
Software Maintenance Phase: during this phase the following activities
are performed:
• The Software Maintenance Records are persistenly recorded each time
a maintenance operation is performed;
• The Software Change Records are persistenly recorded each time a
Change Request (CR) is issued, both to implement a new functionality
(enhancement CR) and to correct an issue (defect CR).
One crucial activity is the verification that one requirement document has
taken into account all requirements defined in the previous phase. In order to
provide a standard method to perform this activity the norm requires trace-
ability matrices between adjacent and corresponding phases. There is one
traceability matrix for each couple of phases (adjacent and corresponding).
Each matrix contains all the requirements of the specification traced to their
refinements in the lower specification phase and viceversa. This activity is
extremely useful in order to check that all the features described in the high
level requirements have been detailed in the following development phases
and that all requirements have been tested in the corresponding phase of the
V right branch.
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Chapter 2
Requirements expressed in
Natural Language and
Ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
Requirements Engineering (RE) refers to the process of defining, document-
ing and maintaining requirements in the software development process (de-
scribed in Section 1.3). Requirements define constraints on the system that
need to be expressed in a form that is suitable for analysis, communication
and subsequent implementation of the system. Furthermore, the number
of requirements grows phase after phase in the descendent branch of the V
cycle, thus a defective requirement has a higher impact when it refers to a
high level phase. The traceability matrices are a useful tool to evaluate the
impact of every requirement on the lifecycle. The first step to deliver the
desired quality product is the full understanding of the customer needs and
their documentation in a clear, complete and concise way.
As stated by Mich in her survey [87] and by Me´ndez et al. in the initia-
tive NaPIRE [37], requirements are usually expressed in Natural Language,
which is inherently ambiguous. An ambiguous specification can lead to two
or more implementors writing interfacing code to operate under different as-
sumptions, despite each programmer’s confidence that he has programmed
the correct behavior.
We may think that, being rational, human beings can usually overcome
17
18 Requirements expressed in Natural Language and Ambiguity
miscommunication caused by ambiguity by using analysis, but this is not
always true in an absolute way. Ambiguity is the characteristic of having
more than one possible interpretation.
Figure 2.1: Example of ambiguity: what is it?
To better explain this concept we refer to Figure 2.1, which is not clear
at first sight: it may have multiple interpretations and even if you argue the
correct one, you may still have some doubts. With a proper explanation,
Figure 2.1 becomes immediately clear, and it seems impossible that a few
seconds before it wasn’t.1
The norms listed in Section 1.1 help to create a process that ensures sys-
tem safety even in presence of defective requirements. In particular, CEN-
ELEC EN-50128 asks requirements documents for railway systems to be
complete, clear, precise, unequivocal, verifiable, testable, maintainable, and
feasible – clause 7.2.4.4 of the norm [26]. To ensure that these quality at-
tributes are met, companies developing railway products have a Verification
Engineer (VE) who reviews for defects any requirements document produced
during the development process. This review activity is time consuming and
error prone, and an automated review assistant might help VEs in their task.
1Figure 2.2
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NLP (Natural Language Processing) refers to all applications aiming at
processing the natural language by means of a computer. While it is quite
challenging to make a tool able to understand the human creativity, it is true
that machines are faster and more precise than humans: NLP techniques use
these strengths to achieve the best result.
Section 2.2 contains a brief summary of the literature on this topic, Sec-
tion 2.3 contains the description of different ambiguity types, Section 2.4
describes some criteria to evaluate NLP techniques performances.
2.2 Literature review
NLP techniques have been largely applied to automate several requirements
engineering tasks, including model synthesis [99], classification of require-
ments into functional/non-functional categories [23], classification of online
product reviews [82], traceability [107, 33], detection of equivalent require-
ments [44], completeness evaluation [49], information extraction [56, 97, 81],
ambiguity detection [111, 12], and its generalization, defect detection. Since
in this paper we focus on defect detection, we will discuss related works in
this field. Techniques developed to address the problem of defects in writ-
ten requirements can be broadly partitioned into two sets. The first set of
techniques suggests to use constrained NL or formal/semi-formal languages
to prevent or limit defects. The second set of techniques starts from un-
constrained NL and generally aims at detecting defects, either by means of
manual verification, or by means of automated tools.
2.2.1 Preventing and limiting defects
In the literature, several strategies were defined to prevent defects by means
of constrained natural languages [85, 94] or (semi-)formal approaches [87, 4,
76, 59].
Concerning the use of constrained natural languages, the EARS [85] and
the Ruppaˆ template [94] are well known constrained formats for editing
requirements. Arora et al. [6] defined an approach to check the conformance
of requirements to these templates. Although the adoption of constrained
natural languages is not widespread in industry, recent studies have shown
that templates can be proficiently used by domain experts [86]. On the other
hand, templates can limit the amount of requirements defects at the syntactic
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level, but linguistic defects may still be present at the lexical, semantic and
pragmatic levels. Addressing these defects requires other techniques [6].
Among the works on (semi-)formal approaches, one of the earlier con-
tributions with a focus on defect prevention is the tool LOLITA [87], which
implements an approach for translating NL requirements into object-oriented
models. Similarly, Circe-Cico [4], starts from NL requirements to generate
models to support requirements analysis. Logic as a tool to identify and an-
alyze inconsistency in requirements from multiple stakeholders is suggested
in [126, 59]. More specifically, these papers propose a tool, named CARL,
that automatically translates NL into logic and then uses theorem proving
and model checking to detect inconsistency in the requirements. The works
of Kof aim to semi-automatically formalise NL requirements into message
sequence charts [74] and automata [75]. More recently, Yue et al. [122] pro-
posed a method and a tool, called aToucan, to automatically generate a UML
software analysis model from textual, functional requirements specifications
expressed in the form of use cases. A systematic study of defects in use case
specifications expressed in restricted NL is presented in [124].
The idea behind the works on (semi-)formal approaches is that the for-
malisation process may help in identifying requirements defects, since errors
in requirements would lead to inconsistencies or omissions in models, and,
due to the more formal nature of models, defects are easier to detect in
models than in textual requirements. However, through an analysis of two
empirical studies, Kamsties [69] concludes that formalization does not help
to eliminate defects from informal requirements documents. Indeed, during
the formalization process the analyst makes implicit assumptions, transform-
ing defects into errors. Therefore, even when formal modelling is applied,
other techniques for defect defection shall be used as a complement.
2.2.2 Detecting defects
Approaches for defect detection can be categorised into manual approaches
and automated ones, mostly based on NLP. Early and successful techniques
for manual requirements inspection were provided in [43, 106]. Inspection
checklists were developed, among others, in [5, 70], while a survey on the
topic of requirements inspection was published in [7].
Automated NLP approaches for defect detection can be be categorised
into those that use rule-based techniques [117, 12, 62, 61, 111, 6, 46] and those
that leverage artificial intelligence techniques [28, 118, 50]. Our contribution
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falls into the first category, which collects all the works in which defects are
identified based on linguistic patterns.
The Ambiguity Handbook of Berry et al. [12] includes one of the most
influential classification of ambiguity-related defects in requirements, and
provides a large set of examples of typically dangerous words and construc-
tions (see Section 2.3). Wilson et al. [117] define a quality model composed
of quality attributes and quality indicators, and develop an automatic tool
(called ARM: Automated Requirement Measurement) to perform the analy-
sis against the quality model aiming to detect defects and to collect metrics.
The tool was applied to industrial requirements from NASA [101]. Gnesi
et al. [62, 42] present QuARS, a tool for defect detection based on a qual-
ity model developed by the authors. Similarly, [61] implemented a grep-
like, pattern-based technique to detect defects, supported by statistical NLP
techniques such as POS tagging. Kiyavitskaya et al. [73] propose a two-step
approach to identify ambiguities in NL requirements. In the first step, a tool
applies a set of ambiguity measures to the requirements, in order to identify
potentially ambiguous sentences. In the second step, a (manually simulated)
tool shows the specific parts that are potentially ambiguous in the set of sen-
tences identified. Tjong et al. [111] developed SREE, a tool that identifies
defects based on a pre-defined list of dangerous terms. Arora et al. [6] use
patterns of linguistic defects as the other works, and, in addition, checks the
conformance of the requirements to a given template.
Among the works that use artificial intelligence techniques, Chantree et
al. [28] present a technique that helps requirements analysts to identify so-
called innocuous ambiguities (i.e., linguistic ambiguities that have a single
reading in practice). The focus of this work is on coordination ambiguities
(i.e., due to the usage of coordinating conjunctions), and a set of heuristics,
developed according to a data-set built by human assessors, is presented to
discriminate between innocuous and nocuous ambiguities. This approach
was extended for anaphoric ambiguities (i.e., due to the usage of pronouns)
in [118]. Finally, Ferrari et al. [50] propose a graph-based technique to detect
pragmatic ambiguities (i.e., ambiguities that depend on the context) in NL
requirements defined for a specific application domain.
All these works, and in particular the ones employing rule-based tech-
niques, were used as fundamental references to define the defect detection
patterns of our study. On the other hand, all the listed works provide limited
validation in real industrial contexts, as noted also in [46]. Large data-sets
22 Requirements expressed in Natural Language and Ambiguity
annotated by experts were considered in [44]. However, their focus is solely
on redundancy defects (i.e., equivalent requirements), detected by means of
information retrieval techniques. The task of finding couples of equivalent
requirements is radically different from the one we are dealing with in our
study, in which multiple linguistic defects occurring in single requirements
are considered. To our knowledge, the more general industrial work on defect
detection is the one presented in [46], who experimented their tool named
Smella on several datasets provided by three companies. Although domain
experts were interviewed to assess the effectiveness of the tool, analysis of the
results was performed by two researchers. Another industrial case study on
defect detection was presented in [116]. Two datasets of 293 requirements in
total were used as a benchmark, and term-based defect detection techniques
were employed to detect ambiguities. The results were reviewed by domain
experts.
The research results reported in the following chapters of this thesis (pub-
lished in [100, 51]) contributes to the recent literature on the industrial appli-
cation of defect detection NLP techniques [46, 116]. Compared to the other
studies, in our work the techniques are implemented, tailored, and validated
by domain experts. Furthermore, this is the first work that shows how rule-
based NLP patterns for defect detection can be incrementally tuned to the
needs of a company, to address the systematic – and domain-dependent –
false positive cases typically raised by these techniques.
2.3 Ambiguity taxonomy
When we read a text written in natural language as rational and intelligent
human beings we use our analysis capabilities to understand it. Usually it
is easy as we do that in our everyday life, but it may happen that some
words or phrases arise doubts which we need to solve using our background
or knowledge of the context. This kind of doubts or questions are known as
ambiguity. It exists in all disciplines where communication is based on nat-
ural language: writing, linguistic, philosophy, law, requirement engineering.
Berry notices that the word ambiguity is ambiguous itself as it suggests to
refer to something with only two possible interpretations while it would have
even more; a better word it would be multiguity [12]. We can distinguish
four broad classes of linguistic ambiguity [61, 12]:
• Lexical ambiguity (Subsection 2.3.1);
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• Syntactic ambiguity (Subsection 2.3.2);
• Semantic ambiguity (Subsection 2.3.3);
• Pragmatic ambiguity (Subsection 2.3.4).
2.3.1 Lexical ambiguity
A lexical ambiguity occurs when a term has multiple meanings. It can hap-
pen in the following cases:
• Homonymy: Occurs when two different words are spelled the same
way, but they have unrelated meanings and sometimes also different
etymologies. Examples of homonyms are the pair stalk (part of a plant)
and stalk (follow/harass a person) and the pair left (past tense of
leave) and left (opposite of right), bank (estabilishment for custody,
loan, exchange, or issue of money) and bank (in the sense of rising
ground bordering a lake, river, or sea). A distinction is sometimes
made between “true” homonyms, which are unrelated in origin, such
as skate (glide on ice) and skate (the fish), and polysemous homonyms,
or polysemes, which have a shared origin, such as mouth (of a river)
and mouth (of an animal);
• Polysemy: Occurs when a word has several related meanings but one
single etymology. For example:
– Man:
1. The human species (i.e., man vs. other organisms);
2. Males of the human species (i.e., man vs. woman);
3. Adult males of the human species (i.e., man vs. boy).
This example shows the specific polysemy where the same word is used
at different levels of a taxonomy. Example 1 contains 2, and 2 contains
3:
– Mole:
1. a small burrowing mammal;
2. consequently, there are several different entities called moles.
Although these refer to different things, their names derive
from 1 (e.g., “A Mole burrows for information hoping to go
undetected”).
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However, other senses of the word (i.e., the skin blemish, the breakwa-
ter, the unit of measure, and the Mexican sauce) are homonyms, not
polysems, as they are each etymologically distinct.
– Book:
1. a bound collection of pages;
2. a text reproduced and distributed (thus, someone who has
read the same text on a computer has read the same book as
someone who had the actual paper volume);
3. to make an action or event a matter of record (e.g., “Unable
to book a hotel room, a man sneaked into a nearby private
residence where police arrested him and later booked him for
unlawful entry.”).
2.3.2 Syntactic ambiguity
Syntactic ambiguity, also called structural ambiguity, occurs when a given
sequence of words can be given more than one grammatical structure, and
each has a different meaning. It can be distinguished as an analytical, at-
tachment, coordination, or elliptical ambiguity:
• Analytical ambiguity: occurs when the role of the constituents within
a phrase or sentence is ambiguous. Among the various patterns of
analytical ambiguity that can occur is the structure of a complex noun
group including modifier scope. For instance “The Tibetan history
teacher” can be read as “The (Tibetan history) teacher”, “The Tibetan
(history teacher)”;
• Attachment ambiguity: occurs when a particular syntactic constituent
of a sentence, such as a prepositional phrase or a relative clause, can be
legally attached to two parts of a sentence. The most popular pattern
of attachment ambiguity is a prepositional phrase that may modify
either a verb or a noun. For example in the phrase “The police shot
the rioters with guns” we can intend with guns either as a modifier
of the noun rioters or as a modifier of the verb shot leading to two
different interpretations;
• Coordination ambiguity: occurs in two conditions:
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1. when more than one conjunction, and or or is used in a sentence
(e.g., “I saw Peter and Paul and Mary saw me”);
2. when one conjunction is used with a modifier (e.g., “Young man
and woman”).
• Elliptical ambiguity: occurs when it is not certain whether or not a
sentence contains an ellipsis. An example is: “Perot knows a richer
man than Trump”. It has two meanings, that Perot knows a man who
is richer than Trump is and that Perot knows a man who is richer than
any man Trump knows (ellipsis present).
2.3.3 Semantic ambiguity
Semantic ambiguity occurs when a sentence has more than one way of reading
it within its context although it contains no lexical or structural ambiguity.
Semantic ambiguity can be viewed as ambiguity with respect to the logical
form, usually expressed in predicate logic, of a sentence. Semantic ambi-
guity can be caused by: coordination ambiguity, referential ambiguity, and
scope ambiguity. Coordination ambiguity is already discussed. Referential
ambiguity is on the borderline between semantic and pragmatic ambiguity,
because referential ambiguity can happen within a sentence or between a
sentence and its discourse context. Thus it is discussed in Subsection 2.3.4
The quantifier operators include such words as every, each, all, some, several,
a, etc., and the negation operators include not.
Scope ambiguity occurs when these operators can enter into different
scoping relations with other sentence constituents. For example, in the sen-
tence “All linguists prefer a theory”, the quantifiers all and a interact in two
ways. When the scope of a includes the scope of all, this sentence means
all linguists love the same one theory. When the scope of all includes the
scope of a, this sentence means that each linguist loves a, perhaps different,
theory. The same thing can happen with negations and quantifiers which
can interact ambiguously. For example, the sentence “No one has seen a pig
with wings”. It can be read as saying either that there exists no pig with
wings or that there exists a mythical pig with wings that no one has ever
seen.
26 Requirements expressed in Natural Language and Ambiguity
2.3.4 Pragmatic ambiguity
Pragmatics, like semantics, investigates the meaning of language; pragmatics
focuses on context-dependent meaning, while semantics on context-invariant
meaning.
Pragmatic ambiguity occurs when a sentence has several meanings in
the context in which it is located. The context comprises for example the
sentences before and after, and the domain beyond the language (i.e., the
situation, the background knowledge, the domain specific language). We
distinguish referential ambiguity and deictic ambiguity. In traditional se-
mantics, the relation between a word or phrase and the object of the real
world that the word or phrase describes is called a reference. An anaphor
is an element of a sentence that depends for its reference on the reference
of another element, possibly of a different sentence. This other element is
called the antecedent and must appear earlier in the same sentence or in a
previous sentence. A referential ambiguity occurs when an anaphor can take
its reference from more than one element, each playing the role of the an-
tecedent. Anaphora include pronouns (e.g., it, they), definite noun phrases,
and some forms of ellipsis. An example of a referential ambiguity is: “The
trucks shall treat the roads before they freeze”. Ellipses can have the same
effect as pronouns and definite nouns, as the following sentence shows. “...
If the ATM accepts the card, the user enters the PIN. If not, the card is
rejected”. The word not is here an elliptical expression that refers either to
the condition specified in the previous sentence or to something written be-
fore that. Deictic ambiguity occurs when pronouns, time and place adverbs,
such as now and here, and other grammatical features, such as tense, have
more than one reference point in the context. The context includes a person
in a conversation, a particular location, a particular instance of time, or an
expression in a previous or following sentence.
2.4 NLP techniques evaluation
In order to quantitatively evaluate the performance of NLP techniques for
defect detection an evaluation criterion has to be defined. These NLP tech-
niques, when used to detect one precise defect typology, share some similar-
ities with binary classifiers, in fact:
• these techniques highlight a part of a sentence that has been detected
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as defective, which is very similar to the predicted condition positive of
a binary classifier;
• sentences – or fractions of them – not highlighted by these techniques
are considered as non-defective, which is very similar to the predicted
condition negative.
Due to these similarities, evaluation criteria applicable to binary classi-
fiers can be applied to the NLP technologies too. In order to measure the
effectiveness, we define the following quantities:
• tp: number of true positive cases. The number of requirements that
contain at least a defect – condition positive – and correctly got pre-
dicted condition positive;
• fp: number of false positive cases. The number of requirements frag-
ments not containing any defect – condition negative – but got predicted
condition positive;
• fn: the number of false negative cases. The number of requirements
that contain at least a defect – condition positive – but got predicted
condition negative;
• tn: number of true negative cases. The number of requirements that
don’t contain any defect – condition negative – and correctly got pre-
dicted condition negative.
Based on these definitions, the measures of accuracy (a), precision (p)
and recall (r) are defined as [96]:
a =
tp+ fp
tp+ fp+ tn+ fn
p =
tp
tp+ fp
r =
tp
tp+ fn
We chose to use as evaluation criteria precision p and recall r. The
precision is negatively influenced by the amount of defects wrongly identified
(fp). The recall is negatively influenced by the amount of undetected defects
(fn). The same evaluation criteria can be used, with the proper extensions
described by Powers [96], also in the general case of multi-class classifiers.
The above described quantitative evaluation of the performance requires
an additional and non-trivial effort: in order to correctly compute the quan-
tities tp, fp, fn and tn the condition positive and negative shall be known
a priori. This knowledge in classification and machine learning problems is
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known as labeling or ground truth, and it consists in the association of a label
to each example composing the dataset used for training and test purposes.
In general the labeling (or annotation) process is conducted manually,
thus it is time consuming and error-prone. In the specific case of Requirement
Engineering, the annotation process is subjective – due to the ambiguities
in NL described in Section 2.3. In order to mitigate as much as possible the
subjectivity of this operation we agreed that the labeling operation has to
be performed by an actor with a proven knowledge of the industrial domain
under consideration. We also agreed that, in order to further decrease the
subjectivity impact, in some conditions the labeling operation has to be
replicated by more than one actor. When using this technique we need to
define a criterion to evaluate the inter-rater agreement and a criterion to
resolve disagreements.
A proper criterion for inter-rater agreement evaluation is the Cohen’s
kappa coefficient (k) [79]. It measures the agreement between two raters
who individually classify N items into C mutually exclusive categories and
it is defined as:
k = 1− 1− po
1− pe
where po is the relative observed agreement among the raters (i.e., the ac-
curacy) and pe is the hypothetical probability of chance agreement. The
hypothetical probability of chance agreement is defined as:
pe =
1
N2
C∑
c=1
nc1nc2
where nci is the number of times rater i predicted category c. According to
Landis and Koch [79], the qualitative inter-rater agreement can be defined
using Cohen’s kappa coefficient as in Table 2.1.
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Inter-rater agreement Cohen’s kappa coefficient
No k < 0
Slight 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.20
Fair 0.20 < k ≤ 0.40
Moderate 0.40 < k ≤ 0.60
Substantial 0.60 < k ≤ 0.80
Almost perfect 0.80 < k ≤ 1
Table 2.1: Interpretation of inter-rater agreement using the Cohen’s kappa
coefficient [79].
Figure 2.2: In case you’re still wondering...
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Chapter 3
Detecting defects: a rule-based
approach
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we first give a background on the NLP technologies used
in the study (Section 3.2). Then, we describe the defined NLP patterns
(Section 3.3), and the identified discard patterns developed in order to ad-
dress systematic false positive cases (Section 3.4). We also describe the tool
SREE [111], and we outline how the tool was used in our study (Section 3.5).
Finally, we summarize the different usage of the presented technologies in
the study.
3.2 NLP technologies
In this section, we list the natural language processing (NLP) technologies
included in the tool GATE [35] that was adopted to define the patterns:
• Tokenization: this technology partitions a document into separate
tokens (e.g., words, numbers, spaces and punctuation);
• Part-of-Speech (POS) Tagging: this technology associates to each
token a Part-of-Speech (e.g., noun (NN), verb (VB), adjective (JJ),
etc.). Common POS taggers are statistical in nature, i.e., they are
trained to predict the POS of a token based on a manually annotated
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corpus. Available POS taggers normally have an accuracy around
97% [83], errors might occur in the POS associated to a token. For
example, in a sentence such as “An incident management team shall
be organised”, the token organised might be incorrectly tagged as an
adjective (JJ), and not as a verb in past participle (VBN);
• Shallow Parsing: this technology identifies noun phrases (NP) – in
this case we speak about Noun Chunking – and verb phrases (VP) – in
this case we speak about Verb Chunking – in sentences. For example,
given the sentence “Messages are received by the system”, a shallow
parser identifies {Messages, the system} as NPs, and {are received} as
VP;
• Gazetteer: this technology searches for occurrences of terms defined
in a list of terms. In our case, we used it to check the presence of vague
terms;
• JAPE Rules: this technology allows defining rules (i.e., high-level
regular expressions) over tokens and other elements in a text [35]. A
rule identifies sequences of elements that match the pattern. Rules are
expressed in the intuitive JAPE grammar, which is similar to regular
expressions. JAPE rules can be rather long to report. In this chapter,
for more clarity to describe JAPE rules, we will use a more concise and
intuitive pseudo-code inspired to the JAPE grammar. In JAPE, and
in our rules, the symbols reported in Table 3.1 are used. Furthermore,
when we use a term in capital letters, this indicates a form of macro
that identifies terms of the specific type (e.g., NUMBER identifies num-
bers, while ELSE identifies the term else in its various orthographic
forms). Although these macros differ in terms of semantics, we expect
that the reader can infer their meaning.
3.3 Patterns for defect detection
This section lists the classes of language defects considered, together with
the patterns (i.e., JAPE rules) defined to identify them. Patterns are de-
fined in terms of sequences of tokens to be matched within a requirement.
Hence, the output produced by one pattern when applied to a requirement is
zero or n requirement fragments (i.e., contiguous sequences of tokens in the
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Expression Meaning
< expr1 > | < expr2 > < expr1 > OR < expr2 >
< expr1 >,< expr2 > < expr1 > AND < expr2 >
! < expr > NOT < expr >
< expr > + One or more elements matching < expr >
< expr > ∗ Zero or more elements matching < expr >
< expr >? Zero or one element matching < expr >
Table 3.1: Symbols used in the JAPE grammar.
requirement) that match the pattern. The patterns were defined with the
idea of identifying the most relevant defects for the Verification Engineers,
and also taking into account the defect classes provided by [12]. In Table 3.2
we report the patterns in a compact version. The JAPE implementation of
the patterns, together with the discard-patterns that will be introduced in
Section 3.4, is available in the public repository1. Below, we describe the
defect classes addressed by each pattern:
Defect Class Pattern
Anaphoric
ambiguity
PANA = (NP)(NP)+
(Split)[0,1]
(Token.POS == PP | Token.POS =∼ PR*)
Coordination
ambiguity
PCO1 = ((Token)+ (Token.string == AND | OR)) [2]
PCO2 = (Token.POS == JJ) (Token.POS == NN | NNS)
(Token.string == AND | OR) (Token.POS == NN | NNS)
Vague terms PVAG = (Token.string ∈ Vague)
Modal adverbs
PADV = (Token.POS == RB | RBR),
(Token.string =∼ “[.]*ly$”)
Passive voice
PPV = (AUXVERB)(NOT)?(Token.POS == RB | RBR)?
(Token.POS ==VBN)
Excessive length PLEN = Sentence.len > 60
Missing condition
PMC = (IF)(Token, !Token.kind == punctuation)*
(Token.kind == punctuation)(!(ELSE | OTHERWISE))
Missing unit
of measurement
PMU1 = (NUMBER)((Token)[0, 1](NUMBER))?(!MEASUREMENT)
PMU2 = (NUMBER)((Token)[0, 1](NUMBER))?(!PERCENT)
Missing reference
PMR = (Token.string == “Ref”)(Token.string == “.”)
(SpaceToken)?(NUMBER)
Undefined term PUT = (Token.kind == word, Token.orth == mixedCaps)
Table 3.2: Pattern adopted for each defect class.
• Anaphoric ambiguity Anaphora occurs in a text whenever a pro-
1https://github.com/ISTI-FMT/QUARS_plus_plus
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noun (e.g., he, it, that, this, which, etc.) refers to a previous part of the
text. The referred part of the text is normally called antecedent. An
anaphoric ambiguity occurs if the text offers more than one antecedent
option [118], either in the same sentence (e.g., “The system shall send
a message to the receiver, and it provides an acknowledge message”
- it = system or receiver?) or in previous sentences. The potential
antecedents for the pronouns are noun phrases (NP), which can be de-
tected by means of a shallow parser. The pattern PANA matches any
sequence of two or more noun phrases (NP), followed by zero or one
sentence separators (Split), followed by a personal pronoun (PP), or
other types of pronouns (PR*);
• Coordination ambiguity Coordination ambiguity occurs when the
use of coordinating conjunctions (e.g., and and or) leads to multiple
potential interpretations of a sentence [28]. Two types of coordination
ambiguity are considered here. The first type includes sentences in
which more than one coordinating conjunction is used in the same
sentence (e.g., “There is a 90° phase shift between sensor 1 and sensor
2 and sensor 3 shall have a 45° phase shift”). The second type includes
sentences in which a coordinating conjunction is used with a modifier
(e.g., “Structured approaches and platforms” – Structured can refer to
approaches only, or also to platforms). Two patterns were defined, one
for each type. PCO1 matches exactly two occurrences (notation “[2]”)
of one or more Tokens followed by a coordinating conjunction. PCO2
matches cases in which an adjective (JJ) precedes a couple of singular
(NN) or plural nouns (NNS), joined by and or or ;
• Vague terms Vagueness occurs whenever a sentence admits borderline
cases, i.e., cases in which the truth value of the sentence cannot be
decided [12]. Vagueness is associated with the usage of terms without
a precise semantics, such as minimal, as much as possible, later, taking
into account, based on, appropriate, etc. In our context, we use the
list of 446 vague terms provided by the QuARS tool [62]. The list
includes single-word and multi-word terms that were collected as source
of vagueness in requirements. PV AG matches any term included in the
set Vague of vague terms;
• Modal adverbs Modal adverbs (e.g., positively, permanently, clearly)
are modifiers that express a quality associated to a predicate. Adverbs
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are discouraged in requirements as potential source of ambiguity [61].
We noticed that, in the requirements of the company, most of the ad-
verbs causing ambiguity were modal adverbs ending with the suffix -ly.
For this reason, PADV matches adverbs in normal form (RB) or in com-
parative form (RBR) that terminate ($ indicates string termination)
with -ly;
• Passive voice The use of passive voice is a defect of clarity in require-
ments, and can lead to ambiguous interpretations in those cases in
which the passive verb is not followed by the subject that performs the
action expressed by the verb (e.g., “The system shall be shut down” –
by which actor?). Passive voice detection is also considered in [61, 47].
To identify passive voice expressions, PPV matches auxiliary verbs fol-
lowed by a verb in past participle (VBN), possibly with negations and
adverbs;
• Excessive length Longer sentences are typically harder to process
than short sentences, and can be source of unclarity. It was chosen
to identify all the sentences that are longer than 60 tokens. Although
this is a rather weak threshold – for generic English texts, sentences are
recommended not to exceed 40 tokens [36] –, we considered this value
appropriate for the length of the sentences in the railway domain;
• Missing condition To be considered complete, each requirement ex-
pressing a condition through the if clause shall have a corresponding
else or otherwise clause. PMC checks whether an if clause is followed
by an else/otherwise clause in the same sentence;
• Missing unit of measurement Each number is required to have
an associated unit of measurement, unless the number represents a
reference (see below). Hence, the patterns check whether a number
has an associated unit, or a percentage value associated to it;
• Missing reference This defect occurs when a reference that appears
in the text in the form Ref. <X> does not appear in the list of refer-
ences of the requirements document. To detect this defect we leverage
the pattern PMR to extract references in the text, and then – through
Java code not reported here – we check whether each number found
appears in the list of references;
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• Undefined term This pattern searches all the terms that follow the
textual form used in the company for defining glossary terms (e.g., re-
strictiveAspect), which are expressed in camelCase format (i.e., mixed-
cap orthography). As for the missing reference case, we leverage the
PUT pattern to search for terms expressed in camelCase, and then we
automatically search the glossary to check whether the term is present
or not.
The defect classes associated to the patterns can be related to part of
the broad quality criteria specified by the CENELEC norms, and reported
in Section 2.1. Furthermore, they can be related to the different levels of
language to which the defect belong, namely lexical, syntactic, semantic and
pragmatic – see 2.3 for a discussion in the context of NL requirements. They
can also be related to the level of detection, which, in our case, is either
lexical or syntactic. Table 3.3 reports these relationships, using a structure
similar to the one adopted by Gleich et al. [61].
Defect Class Criterion Lev. of Language Detection
Anaphoric ambiguity Unequivocal
Syntactic, Semantic,
Pragmatic
Syntactic
Coordination ambiguity Unequivocal Syntactic, Semantic Syntactic
Vague terms Precise Pragmatic Lexical
Modal adverbs Precise Pragmatic Syntactic
Passive voice Clear Semantic, Pragmatic Syntactic
Excessive length Clear Semantic, Pragmatic Lexical
Missing condition Complete Semantic, Pragmatic Syntactic
Missing unit of
measurement
Complete Semantic, Pragmatic Lexical
Missing reference Complete Semantic, Pragmatic Lexical
Undefined term Complete Semantic, Pragmatic Lexical
Table 3.3: Patterns associated to the different CENELEC criteria, and to
the different levels of language.
3.4 Discard patterns
A set of context-aware patterns was defined along the case study based on an
analysis of the false positive cases produced by the defect detection patterns
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(see Section 6.4.2). For the sake of clarity, we refer to these additional
patterns as discard patterns. Each discard pattern is associated to one defect
class. The defect class is the one whose patterns generate the systematic false
positive cases. The discard patterns, adapted from the JAPE rules reported
in our repository, are shown in Table 3.4, and briefly described below:
Defect Class Discard Pattern
Anaphoric
ambiguity
DANA = ((Token.POS == PP | Token.POS = PR*)
within IT SHALL BE POSSIBLE)
Vague terms
DVAG1 = (PVAG, Token.string ==∼ “(?i)sound” | “(?i)light”,
Token.POS == NN | NNS)
DVAG2 = (PVAG within IT SHALL BE POSSIBLE)
DVAG3 = (PVAG within StophPhrasesV ague)
Modal adverbs
DADV1 = (Token.string ==∼ “(?i)manually” | “(?i)automatically”)
DADV2 = (PADV within INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY)
Undefined term DUT = (PUT contains KnownAcronym)
Table 3.4: Discard patterns.
• Anaphoric ambiguity: the patternDANA detects the pronoun within
sentences matching the pattern IT SHALL BE POSSIBLE. This pat-
tern matches the expressions it shall be possible, it may be possible
and it should be possible, in their orthographic variants, and possibly
including other terms within the pattern (e.g., it should also be possi-
ble). The JAPE notation “within” indicates that the first argument is
completely included in the second argument. Each ambiguity detected
through the pattern PANA is discarded when it includes DANA;
• Vague terms: the pattern DV AG1 matches all the tokens in which
the terms sound and light are used as nouns, according to the anno-
tations of the POS Tagger. The JAPE notation “(?i)” indicates that
all orthographic variants of the string shall be matched. The pat-
tern DV AG2 matches the term possible when used within the pattern
IT SHALL BE POSSIBLE. The pattern DV AG3 matches any vague
term included in the list of stop phrases StopPhrasesV ague, which
collects the set of domain specific terms that include vague terms (e.g.,
distant signalling distance, near miss), according to our analysis of
the false positive cases. Each vague term detected through PV AG is
discarded when it includes DV AG1 , DV AG2 or DV AG3 ;
• Modal Adverbs: the pattern DADV1 matches the terms manually
and automatically. The pattern DADV2 matches the term only within
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the expression information purposes only. Each modal adverb detected
through PADV is discarded when it includes DADV1 or DADV2 ;
• Undefined term: the pattern DUT matches any unknown term an-
notation (PUT ) that contains a known acronym (i.e., a term included
in the list KnownAcronym). Any PUT annotation is discarded when
it includes DUT .
3.5 SREE patterns
The tool SREE [111] is a defect detection tool for NL requirements that is
oriented to achieve 100% recall for the defects in its scope, even at the cost
of lower precision. SREE leverages a set of dictionaries of typically defec-
tive terms (single and multi-word). A requirement that includes a term that
matches one of the terms of the dictionaries is returned by SREE as a poten-
tially defective requirement. Furthermore, the matched term is also returned.
The key feature of SREE resides in searching only for lexical matches, with-
out leveraging POS Taggers or other statistical tools that may, in principle,
decrease the recall. The approach is analogous to the one adopted in our
work for the pattern for Vague terms (see Section 3.3).
SREE employs ten dictionaries, and each dictionary is associated to a
defect class. The defect classes, together with representative examples of
the terms included – called SREE indicators [111] – are:
• Continuance: as follows, below, following, in addition, in particular,
etc.;
• Coordinator: and, and/or, or;
• Directive: e.g., etc., figure, for example, i.e., note, table;
• Incomplete: TBA, TBD, as a minimum, as defined, as specified, etc.;
• Optional: as desired, at last, either, eventually, if appropriate, in case
of, if necessary, etc.;
• Plural: contains a list of 11, 287 plural nouns, each ending in “s”;
• Pronoun: anyone, he, her, this, they, which, whom, yourself, etc.;
• Quantifier: all, any, few, little, many, much, several, some;
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• Vague: ( ), [], as far as, as required, eventually, mutually-agreed, etc.;
• Weak: can, could, may, might, ought to, preferred, should, will, would.
The complete list of terms for each dictionary, with the exception of
the plural class, can be found in [111]. For the plural class, we contacted
Daniel M. Berry, who kindly provided the list. In our study we adopted the
dictionaries of SREE. Specifically, each SREE dictionary was imported in
GATE as a separate Gazetteer. In our evaluation we apply all the SREE
dictionaries, with the exception of the dictionary of the weak class, since this
class was initially excluded from the analysis.
3.5.1 SREE-reduced
A subset of SREE was also adopted in our case study. The selection, which
we call SREE-reduced, is composed of the terms that are specific to SREE,
and are not considered in our patterns. In particular, pronouns are sources
of anaphoric ambiguities, and are considered in our PANA pattern. Further-
more, the coordinators and and or are sources of coordination ambiguities
and are considered in our PCO1 and PCO2 , while the expression and/or was
considered in our list Vague of vague terms. Finally, also part of the terms
included in the different SREE dictionaries are included in our Vague list.
Therefore, SREE-reduced is composed of the dictionaries of SREE but ex-
cluding:
1. the dictionaries of the coordinator, pronoun and weak class;
2. all the terms in the other dictionaries that were already part of the
Vague list.
3.6 NLP technologies applied to our case study
In this section we summarize the different experimental usage of the NLP
technologies presented above to address the study goal. As already said, the
grand objective of our case study, described in detail in the following chap-
ters, was to investigate to which extent NLP can be practically applied to
detect defects in the requirements documents. In order to improve the cost-
effectiveness of the verification activity it was important to maximize both
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precision and recall: for a proficient use of the provided tool by the Verifi-
cation Engineers it has to show all possible defects without missing nothing
and hopefully without showing too many false positive cases. Therefore we
applied an iterative process (Chapter 4, Figure 4.1) in order to maximize the
identified defects minimizing the false positive cases. From here descends the
decision to use first our identified patterns, then the discard ones and at the
end we tried to improve the obtained recall choosing within SREE dictionar-
ies (Section 3.5) the potential words missing in our patterns (Section 3.5.1).
Chapter 4
Research methodology and Case
study design
4.1 Introduction
The experience presented in this chapter and in chapters 5, 6 and 71 has been
conducted in collaboration with Alstom, one of the major railway companies.
The case study selection has been triggered by the involved company and by
its need to support Verification Engineers in their task of requirements review
with automated tools. Specifically, the company contacted two research
institutions, namely ISTI-CNR and University of Florence, and during the
case study the following roles were identified and requested:
• NLP-E: this role identifies an NLP Expert, that is, a researcher with
proven knowledge of NLP techniques;
• VE: this role identifies an actor with a proven knowledge of CENELEC
standards and a strong background as a Verification Engineer.
The subjects taking these roles are presented in Section 5.2.2.
This research experience shares the typical characteristics of case study
research, in that the phenomenon under study is analyzed within its natural
context (in particular a railway company) and the boundary between the
context and the phenomenon are not clearly evident, and cannot be fully
controlled [120]. It also includes iterative and improving aspects that are
1This experience has been published in [100, 51]
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closer to action research [8], and technology transfer [63]. Overall, our em-
pirical design can be regarded as an exploratory and iterative case study. Its
design largely follows the guidelines provided in [103], adapted to the itera-
tive context of our experience. Specifically, each iteration follows a template
reference structure, which includes research question (RQ) definition, data
collection procedures, and data analysis procedures. Each iteration is based
on specific RQs, and its results are used as triggers to define additional RQs
to be answered in the next iteration. In the following, we first outline the
RQs produced, and then we describe the template structure adopted in each
iteration.
4.2 Research objective and Research questions
The research objective can be decomposed into the following RQs. It should
be noticed that the RQs have been generated along with the case study
iterations, and were not already defined at the beginning of the study. We
will keep that same order in the following enumeration.
Each RQ will be associated to one or more iterations of the case study.
Given the iterative nature of research question generation, we consider it
appropriate to present the research questions together with the outline of
the iterations that addressed them.
• RQ1: What is the accuracy of the NLP patterns for defect
detection?
We want to provide a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of the
patterns in identifying requirements defects. The assumption is that
the higher the measures of accuracy, the more effective are the pat-
terns. To this end, we want to compare the results of the applica-
tion of the patterns with the defects identified by domain experts (i.e.,
VEs). The accuracy is measured in terms of precision and recall. The
former indicates how many of the defects identified by a tool are con-
sidered as defects by VEs. The latter indicates how many of the defects
identified by VEs are actually identified by a tool. Precise definitions
are given in Section 2.4, and will both consider single defects and de-
fective requirements as described in Section 4.3.3. Single defects are
requirements fragments considered defective according to a specific de-
fect class, while defective requirements are requirements that include
at least one single defect.
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• RQ2: Which are the cases of inaccuracy of the NLP patterns
for defect detection?
We want to provide a qualitative analysis of the effectiveness of the
patterns. More specifically, we want to understand which are the spe-
cific cases in which the patterns fail in identifying defects. This is done
in terms of (a) defects identified by VEs that are not detected by the
patterns (i.e., false negative cases, which impact on recall); and (b) in
terms of defects that are detected by the patterns, but are not consid-
ered as defects by the VEs (i.e., false positive cases, which impact on
precision), as stated in Section 2.4.
• RQ3: What is the precision of NLP patterns for defect de-
tection when complemented with discard patterns?
This question was generated after answering RQ2. Indeed, it was ob-
served that the defect detection patterns generate systematic false pos-
itive cases, which could be addressed with discard patterns. The appli-
cation of discard patterns is expected to increase the precision of the
overall approach, and this question aims at quantitatively evaluating
to which extent the precision can be increased.
• RQ4: Can a third-party tool identify additional defects?
We want to understand whether the usage of an additional tool can al-
low us to address false negative cases, and to identify additional defects
not considered in the patterns. To this end, we apply the dictionaries
of SREE, a tool specifically designed to achieve 100% recall on the de-
fects considered. To answer this broad question, we decompose it into
the following sub-questions.
– RQ4.1: What is the accuracy of SREE with respect to the
NLP patterns for defect detection complemented with
discard patterns?
We first want to understand whether SREE identifies defective
requirements identified by the VEs, and not identified by the
patterns (i.e., false negatives). By answering this question, we
provide a quantitative evaluation of the accuracy of SREE in
identifying defective requirements, in terms of recall and preci-
sion. The comparison with the patterns is useful to understand
whether SREE and the patterns can be considered as complemen-
tary tools.
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– RQ4.2: What is the precision of SREE?
This question was generated after answering RQ4.1, and noticing
that SREE generates a large number of false positive require-
ments. This suggested that SREE may be less precise than the
patterns also at the level of single defects. Thus we wanted to
further assess the precision obtained by using uniquely the tool
SREE.
– RQ4.3: Which additional defects can be identified with
SREE?
This question was generated after answering RQ4.1. Indeed, we
considered that some of the false positive requirements issued by
SREE could include specific defects not considered by the pat-
terns. Therefore the goal was to understand whether novel cate-
gories of defects can be identified using SREE.
– RQ4.4: Which are the false positive cases for SREE?
This question was generated after answering RQ4.1, and as a
qualitative complement to RQ4.2, to check which are the typi-
cal sources of false positives at the level of defects.
4.3 Data collection and Analysis procedures
To collect and analyze the data necessary to answer the RQs, each itera-
tion followed a template structure. The template structure of the iterations
is depicted in Figure 4.1. The template is composed of eight tasks, which
are further grouped into three main phases, namely Preparation, Data Col-
lection, and Data Analysis. The phases are designed to ensure a minimal
intervention of NLP-E in the execution of the case study. Specifically, the
contribution of NLP-E was limited to the Preparation and Data Analysis
phases. The Data Collection phase was carried out by the VEs involved in
the specific iterations.
4.3.1 Preparation
The preparation phase consists of two tasks, described below:
• Research Questions: definition of RQs which are going to be an-
swered by the iteration. If in the previous iteration, the RQs are
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Figure 4.1: Template structure adopted in the iterations of the case-study.
considered to require another iteration to be answered, the previous
RQs are kept. Furthermore, in this phase, a specific instance of the
template is chosen so that this is appropriate to answer the questions.
In particular, the phases of the template that will be performed are
selected – not all the phases are required for each iteration;
• Patterns Definition: patterns are defined and implemented to sup-
port defect detection. The patterns will be employed in the iteration.
In this phase, we consider the definition of defect detection patterns,
the definition of discard patterns, and also the implementation of the
patterns that support the dictionaries of SREE. If the patterns are
defined in previous iterations, this phase is not performed.
4.3.2 Data collection procedure
Data are collected according to the following tasks:
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• Dataset Selection: a requirements dataset is selected, to which we
apply the patterns;
• Dataset Annotation: the dataset is manually annotated for defects.
Annotations may have been performed also before the current study,
as for Large-scale Study - 1st Iteration, see Section 5.3.2. In this case,
for the sake of structure and clarity of the presentation, we consider
the annotation as it would be performed during this task. If both the
dataset and the annotations come from a previous iteration, this phase
is not performed. The output of this phase is a set of requirements
which are annotated as accepted, if they do not contain defects, or
rejected, if they contain at least one defect. Furthermore, depending
on the iteration considered, annotations associated to specific defects
are also provided. More specifically, the annotation was performed
as follows: given a requirement, this was labelled as accepted if it
appeared to fulfill the criteria normally adopted by the company. These
criteria are derived from the more general guidelines provided by the
CENELEC EN-50128:2011 norm [26], and considering also the IEEE
Std 1233-1998 as a reference [67]2. In particular, a requirement was
labeled as accepted if it was: (a) feasible: what is required is physically
and technologically possible, can be done with available resources and
is not against laws and regulations; (b) testable: can be demonstrated
through repeatable tests or is at least verifiable through inspection; (c)
complete: stand-alone, no missing references, undefined terms, to-be-
defined parts, or missing conditions; (d) clear and unambiguous; (e)
uniquely identifiable; (f) consistent : no internal contradiction and no
contradiction with other requirements. The requirement was labeled
as rejected in case it did not fulfill one of the criteria. In case the
requirement was marked as rejected for criterion (c) or criterion (d),
the VE involved stated whether the rejection was due to one or more
linguistic defect classes associated to the patterns listed in Section 3.3.
In this case, the VE involved labelled as defective(i) each requirement
fragment that included the i -th defect. Different defective requirement
fragments can thus overlap;
• Patterns Application: the patterns are applied on the annotated
dataset, and potentially defective requirements are produced as output;
2The standard is currently replaced by ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2011 [68].
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• Output Annotation: in each iteration, this task is considered as mu-
tually exclusive with the Dataset Annotation task. Indeed this task is
mainly oriented to assess the precision of the output of the patterns,
and has been introduced when doubts were raised about the quality of
the original annotations, or whenever further assessment was required.
This task is performed as follows. For each requirement fragment la-
belled as defective according to pattern i, each VE annotated the frag-
ment as defective(i), if the VE considered the defect as a true defect3.
Overall, if a fragment was annotated as defective(i) by at least one
VE, the fragment was marked as defective(i) in the annotated set
used for the evaluation. This choice (instead of the unanimity one)
enlarges the number of defective fragments, but prevents us to miss
some possible ambiguous fragment.
4.3.3 Data analysis procedure
Data analysis is performed according to the following tasks:
• Quantitative Evaluation: the accuracy of the patterns in detecting
defects is evaluated. In particular, we evaluate the values of precision
and recall (see Section 2.4) of the patterns with respect to the golden
standard (i.e., the performed annotations). Evaluation measures for
single defects and for entire requirements are provided, and defined as
follows:
– Evaluation Measures by Defect: To measure the effectiveness of
the patterns, we first provide a set of measures that focus on
single defective fragments identified by the patterns. Given the
pattern associated to the i -th defect, we consider the amount of
true positive tpD as the number of requirements fragments labeled
as defective(i) and correctly identified by the pattern; the amount
of false positive fpD as the number of requirements fragments
wrongly identified as defective by the pattern; the amount of false
negative fnD as the number of requirements fragments labeled as
defective(i) that are not discovered by the pattern. Based on
these definitions, we define the measure of precision (pD) and
recall (rD) using the same equations provided in Section 2.4;
3In this context, we consider as a pattern i also a dictionary from SREE-reduced, as
defined in Section 3.5
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– Evaluation Measures by Requirement: to have a view of the ef-
fectiveness of the patterns applied together, we provide a set of
measures that focus on the number of requirements, instead of on
the number of defective fragments. Here, we consider the amount
of true positive tpR as the number of requirements labeled as re-
jected for which at least one of the patterns correctly identified a
defective requirement fragment; the amount of false positive fpR
as the number of requirements wrongly identified as defective (i.e.,
at least one of the patterns triggered a defect while the require-
ment was marked as accepted); the amount of false negative fnR
as the number of requirements marked as rejected for which none
of the patterns triggered a defect. The measures of precision pR
and recall rR are defined using the same equations provided in
Section 2.4.
Depending on the iteration, different evaluation measures are used,
among those listed above;
• Qualitative Evaluation: cases of inaccuracy of the patterns are eval-
uated and classified. In particular, the results produced by the pat-
terns are inspected, and classes of inaccuracy cases are provided; for
each class a representative example has been extracted. The interac-
tion between the involved subjects was performed by means of on-line
calls, and shared documents.
4.4 Validity procedure
The validity procedure adopted aims to ensure the validity of the data used
in the study.
To ensure the validity of the annotations performed on the datasets dur-
ing the Output Annotation task, the annotation process is independently
performed by two VEs. The inter-rater agreement is computed by means
of the Cohen’s kappa coefficient (see Section 2.4 and Table 2.1). In case
of disagreement, if at least one of the annotators considered a requirement
as defective, the requirement was considered defective in the final set used
during the analysis. This validity procedure was not followed in the Pilot
Study, due to its preliminary nature (Section 5.3.1). Furthermore, it was not
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followed during the Dataset Annotation task. Specific threats associated to
this aspect are discussed in Section 6.9.
Second, we ensure the validity of the quantitative results reported, by
replicating part of the study.
Third, to limit the researcher bias, the intervention of NLP-E was limited
to the Preparation and Data Analysis phases, while Data Collection was
entirely performed by the VEs involved in each iteration.
NLP-E never had access to the datasets used, but solely to the quantita-
tive results produced.
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Chapter 5
Experimentation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the execution of the case study. We first describe the
characteristics of the case and the subjects involved, and then we describe the
different iterations performed in relation to the RQs presented in Section 4.2.
5.2 Case and Subjects description
5.2.1 The company and its process
The company produces signalling equipment for both railway and urban
transport applications. In order to efficiently produce such systems, the
company develops a set of different products aimed to provide generic func-
tionalities; specific projects based on their product lines are then developed
in order to satisfy customer’s specific needs. These needs are usually ex-
pressed in requirements released by the customer to the companies tender-
ing for contract. The requirements are then elaborated and refined by the
company, without relying on standard editing guidelines. The company, for
both products and projects, applies the V-model for life-cycle management
according to the CENELEC standard [26] as described in Chapter 1. As
dictated by the standard, a requirements’ review activity is performed by
the Validation Team, according to the criteria reported in Section 4.3.2.
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5.2.2 Subjects
The case study has been conducted by a team composed as follows:
• NLP-E: a researcher of ISTI-CNR who covered the NLP-E role de-
scribed in Section 4.1;
• VE-A: the author of this thesis and a former Verification Engineer
who covered the VE role described in Section 4.1. This actor, during
the development of the case study, acquired strong knowledge on NLP
techniques;
• VE1: a Verification Engineer covering the VE role described in Sec-
tion 4.1. This actor, during the development of the case study, acquired
strong knowledge on NLP techniques;
• VE2: a Verification Engineer with strong experience in tender require-
ments review covering the VE role described in Section 4.1.
VE-A, VE1 and VE2 belonged to different groups within the company,
but they were subject to the same company practices. VE1 and VE-A vol-
untarily participated to the study. VE2 participated to the study since the
requirements reviewed by him before this work was conceived (D-Large, see
below) were used in the case study.
5.2.3 Datasets
The datasets made available for this research activity consist of:
• Pilot Dataset (D-Pilot): this dataset consists of 241 system require-
ments. This dataset was randomly selected from the requirements doc-
uments of a wayside Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system and
an interlocking (IXL) system belonging to the same product. ATP
systems are embedded platforms that enforce the rules of signaling
systems, by adding an on-board automatic control over the speed limit
allowed to trains along the track. Instead, IXL systems controls the
movement of trains in the railway yard, by setting signal statuses, and
moving railway switches. This dataset is composed by the following re-
quirements types: functional, architectural, interface and performance;
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ID Iteration Name Nature RQs Patterns Dataset
0 Pilot Exploratory
RQ1
RQ2
Def. Det. Patterns D-Pilot
1 Large-scale - 1st Exploratory
RQ1
RQ2
Def. Det. Patterns D-Large
2 Large-scale - 2nd Explanatory
RQ1
RQ2
Def. Det. Patterns D-Large
3 Large-scale - 3rd Improving RQ3
Def. Det. Patterns
+
Discard Patterns
D-Large
4 Large-scale - 4th Improving RQ4.1 SREE D-Large
5 Large-scale - 5th Explanatory
RQ4.2
RQ4.3
RQ4.4
SREE-reduced D-Large
Table 5.1: Outline of the different iterations performed.
• Large-scale Dataset (D-Large): this dataset consists of 1866 re-
quirements. The requirements belong to a requirements document con-
cerning a system-of-systems that includes an interlocking system, an
ATP, a CTC (Centralised Traffic Control) and an Axle Counter. In-
terlocking and ATP systems have been briefly described above. CTC
systems monitor and dispatch trains. Axle Counters are embedded
systems located along the railway line, which detect the passing of a
train between two points on a track. The requirements were originally
written by the customer in international English language and refined
by the company. No particular glossary restrictions are applied and no
guideline was provided. This dataset is composed by the following re-
quirements types: functional, architectural, interface and ergonomical.
In all these datasets safety requirements are not included, since they
are handled by an independent safety assessment process, which produces
separately the safety requirements documents.
5.3 Iterations
The execution of the case study consists in a set of iterations: each iteration
is aimed at answering one or more RQs, and, although the overall case study
is exploratory, each iteration has a different flavor, which range from ex-
ploratory, to explanatory and to improving. Furthermore, in each iteration,
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ID
Res.
Quest.
Pat.
Def.
Data.
Sel.
Data.
Ann.
Pat.
App.
Out.
Ann.
Quant.
Eval.
Qual.
Eval.
0
VE1
NLP-E
VE1
NLP-E
VE1 VE1 VE1 - VE1
VE1
NLP-E
1
VE1
NLP-E
- VE1 VE2
VE1/
VE-A
-
VE1/
VE-A
VE1
NLP-E
2
VE1
NLP-E
- - - -
VE1
VE-A
VE1/
VE-A
VE1/VE-A
NLP-E
3
VE-A
NLP-E
VE-A
NLP-E
- - VE-A - VE-A -
4
VE-A
NLP-E
VE-A
NLP-E
- - VE-A - VE-A
VE-A
NLP-E
5
VE-A
NLP-E
VE-A
NLP-E
- - VE-A
VE1
VE-A
VE-A
VE-A
NLP-E
Table 5.2: Tasks performed and subjects involved in each iteration.
different tasks of the template are performed. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 give an
outline of the different iterations. Overall, the case study consists of six it-
erations. The first one is a Pilot Study, based on a preliminary requirements
dataset (D-Pilot), while the others belong to the Large-scale Study, based
on a larger requirements dataset (D-Large). Table 5.1 shows the nature of
the iteration, the associated RQs, the patterns and dataset used. Iterations
from 0 to 2 were dedicated to investigate the accuracy of NLP patterns (RQ1,
RQ2), with different levels of insight. Iteration 3 was dedicated to improve
the precision of the patterns (RQ3). Iteration 4 and 5 were focused on the
application of the SREE dictionaries (RQ4.1-4). Table 5.2 shows the tasks
performed together with the subjects who participated to the task.
As already stated in Section 4.4, the role of NLP-E has been involved
during Research Questions, Patterns Definitions and Qualitative Evaluation
in order to limit as much as possible the researcher influence in the case
study execution. Here, we briefly summarize the rationale, execution and
results of each iteration, with reference – explicit or implicit – to Table 5.1
and 5.2. We do not provide all the justifications for the content of the tables,
since extensive details are given in the subsequent subsections.
• Pilot Study: this iteration was oriented to have a first understanding
of the applicability of NLP patterns for defect detection in the context
of the company. To this end, the defect detection patterns (Def. Det.
Patterns in Table 5.1, reported in Section 3.3) were defined by VE1
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under the guidance of NLP-E, with the objective of maximizing recall
[11]. Then, they were applied by VE1 on a limited dataset of the
company, i.e., D-Pilot, which was previously annotated for defects by
VE1. A recall of 88.33% (rR) and a precision of 64.24% (pR) were
obtained, and the recall rD for single defects reached 100% for the
majority of the patterns.
• Large Scale Study - 1st Iteration: given the encouraging result of
the previous iteration, the defect detection patterns were applied by
VE1 on D-Large, annotated for defects by VE2. The goal was now
to understand whether the approach was applicable on a larger set
of requirements of the company, annotated by a subject who did not
participate to the definition of the patterns. Furthermore, the tasks
named Patterns Application and Quantitative Evaluation, originally
performed by VE1, were replicated by VE-A (VE1/VE-A in Table 5.2),
to confirm the validity of the produced data. In this iteration, the re-
sults were acceptable in terms of recall (rR = 85.39%), but particularly
poor in terms of precision, with pR = 5.81%. A non-systematic Qual-
itative Evaluation performed by VE1 suggested that many potential
linguistic defects were ignored by VE2 in his annotation, thus leading
to the low value of precision observed.
• Large Scale Study - 2nd Iteration: this iteration aimed at system-
atically explaining the poor results of the previous one. In particular,
we were interested in understanding whether the false positive cases
produced according to the annotations of VE2 could be considered as
true positives (i.e., defects), if an additional annotation was performed
with a focus on linguistic defects. Therefore, the output of the Pattern
Application task from the previous iteration was considered – as shown
in Table 5.2, the tasks from Patterns Definition to Patterns Application
were not performed again. The Output Annotation task was carried
out by VE1 and VE-A, and their agreement was assessed. Quantita-
tive Evaluation was performed by VE1, and then replicated by VE-A.
The precision obtained was pR = 77.37%, and the average precision at
defect level – average of pD for the different defects – was 72.81%. This
confirmed the effectiveness of the patterns for linguistic defects. The
Qualitative Evaluation, also replicated, was supported by NLP-E, and
allowed the identification of classes of systematic false positive cases,
which could be potentially discarded with additional patterns.
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• Large Scale Study - 3rd Iteration: based on the Qualitative Evalua-
tion of the previous iteration, we wanted to understand to which extent
the precision could be further increased through additional patterns,
designed to discard false positive cases (Discard Patterns in Table 5.1,
reported in Section 3.4). VE-A took the lead in this activity due to
other company-related commitments of VE1, and defined a set of dis-
card patterns under the guidance of NLP-E. With these patterns, the
precision pR further increased to 83.16%, and the average pD reached
81.36%.
• Large Scale Study - 4th Iteration: this iteration aimed at un-
derstanding whether the defect-detection capabilities of the approach
could be complemented with the usage of an additional tool, namely
SREE (see Section 3.5). To have a general, initial indication, we con-
sidered the annotations performed by VE2 on D-Large (annotations
already used in Large Scale Study - 1st Iteration), and we checked
whether SREE was able to identify requirements that were annotated
as defective by VE2, but were not identified by our patterns. To this
end, the performance of SREE, in terms of pR and rR, were compared
with those of the defect detection patterns complemented with discard
patterns. VE-A performed all the tasks included in this iteration. The
Quantitative Evaluation task showed that SREE achieved higher recall
with respect to our patterns (rR = 96.63% vs 85.39%), but at the cost
of lower precision (pR = 5.45% vs 6.24% – i.e., 351 additional false pos-
itive requirements). SREE was therefore recognised as an appropriate
complement to our patterns, i.e., undetected defective requirements
could be identified, but further investigation was required to explain
its poor performance in terms of precision.
• Large Scale Study - 5th Iteration: this iteration was driven by the
low value of precision obtained with SREE at the level of requirements,
and was oriented to have a fine-grained assessment of the performance
of SREE. Specifically, we wanted to assess the precision of SREE at the
level of the single defects in its scope. VE-A used a subset of the SREE
dictionaries, i.e., SREE-reduced (see Section 3.5), including solely those
terms that were specific to SREE and were not already considered in
our patterns. The Output Annotation task was performed in parallel
by VE1 and VE-A on the single defects produced by SREE-reduced,
and their agreement was assessed. Although the average pD for the
5.3 Iterations 57
different defects resulted to be only 11.29%, the Qualitative Evaluation,
performed by VE-A and NLP-E, showed that several novel classes of
defects discovered were not considered by our patterns. This confirmed
the complementary role of SREE with respect to our patterns.
In the following subsections, we report how each specific iteration was
executed. The reader should refer to Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 to have a
structured summary of the information provided in each subsection.
5.3.1 Pilot Study
Fig. 5.1 gives an outline of the iteration. The iteration involved NLP-E and
VE1, and aimed to address RQ1 and RQ2. In this iteration, all the tasks of
the template are performed, with the exception of Output Annotation. This
iteration was exploratory, in that it aimed to assess the accuracy of NLP
patterns on a limited dataset of the company. The tasks performed are as
follows:
Patterns
Definition
(VE1, NLP-E)
Dataset
Selection
(VE1)
Dataset
Annotation
(VE1)
Patterns
Application
(VE1)
Research
Questions
(VE1, NLP-E)
Qualitative
Evaluation
(VE1, NLP-E)
Quantitative
Evaluation
(VE1)
Output
Annotation
Figure 5.1: Structure of the Pilot Study.
• Research Questions: RQ1 and RQ2 were defined in collaboration
between NLP-E and VE1. In this iteration, the underlying goal was to
establish whether the patterns were able to achieve a recall value close
to 100%. Defect detection techniques shall favor recall over precision
since the cost of undetected true defects is much higher than the cost
of manually discarding false positive cases [11].
58 Experimentation
• Patterns Definition: NLP-E considered that assessing the effective-
ness of a domain-generic tool for defect detection (e.g., QuARS [62])
would have required a strong expertise in the domain of the require-
ments documents. In addition, he considered that, if the tool had pro-
vided too many false positive cases, e.g., innocuous ambiguities [28],
the company would not have considered the tool as appropriate for its
needs. Hence, it was decided to let VE1 develop the tool in-house,
with the support of NLP-E.
VE1 was initially required to study some papers [12], [62], [61], [111]
and [6]. Then, she was required to perform the tutorials provided by
GATE (General Architecture for Text Engineering, see [35]), which
was the generic NLP tool selected to be tailored to support defect
detection. The tool was chosen since it was considered sufficiently easy
to use for an engineer, and sufficiently powerful for the task. After this
training, VE1 and NLP-E met to define the defect classes on which to
focus. Priority was given to those defect classes that were considered
more relevant from the point of view of VE1 – taking into account
the defect classes provided in [12], and in the other papers she had
studied – and whose identification was considered feasible by NLP-E.
VE1 autonomously implemented the patterns, under the supervision
of NLP-E.
The patterns developed are reported in Section 3.3.
• Dataset Selection: D-Pilot was selected by VE1 under the guidance
of representatives of the company.
• Dataset Annotation: the dataset was manually annotated by VE1.
After this task, 120 requirements were marked as rejected, while 121
were marked as accepted1.
• Patterns Application: the task was then carried out using the sup-
port of GATE.
• Quantitative Evaluation: VE1 provided NLP-E with a table with
the results of the evaluation. The measures used are for defects, tpD,
fpD, fnD, pD, rD, and for requirements, tpR, fpR, fnR, pR, rR.
1The dataset appears balanced since VE1 continued to randomly select new require-
ments from the original requirements considered, until a balanced number of accepted and
rejected requirements was obtained.
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• Qualitative Evaluation: VE1 evaluated false positive and false neg-
ative cases, and provided representative examples. VE1 and NLP-E
interacted so that NLP-E could tailor the cases and examples for re-
porting.
5.3.2 Large-scale Study - 1st Iteration
Fig. 5.2 gives an outline of the iteration. The iteration involved NLP-E, VE-
A, VE1 and VE2. This iteration is still based on RQ1 and RQ2, in that it
aims to further answer the RQs with a case modification – in terms of dataset
used and annotator –, and the nature of the iteration is still exploratory. All
the tasks, with the exception of Patterns Definition and Output Annotation
are performed. The patterns were the one used in the previous iteration. To
confirm the validity of the produced data, VE-A replicated part of the tasks.
The parts replicated by VE-A are represented in dashed line in Fig. 5.2. The
tasks performed are as follows.
Dataset
Selection
(VE1)
Patterns
Definition
Dataset
Annotation
(VE2)
Patterns
Application
(VE1/VE-A)
Output
Annotation
Quantitative
Evaluation
(VE1/VE-A)
Qualitative
Evaluation
(VE1, NLP-E)
Research
Questions
(VE1, NLP-E)
Figure 5.2: Structure of the Large-scale Study – 1st Iteration.
• Research Questions: the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 were kept
from the previous task. The objective of this iteration was to perform
an assessment of the patterns on a larger requirements dataset of the
company, previously validated by VE2, to understand to which extent
the approach could be applicable more widely within the company.
• Dataset Selection: D-Large was selected by VE1, under the guidance
of representatives of the company.
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• Dataset Annotation: the defects of the document were previously
annotated by VE2, following the criteria of the company already out-
lined in Sect. 4.3.2. Since this task was performed before this work
was conceived, the annotation of the defective fragments was not per-
formed by VE2, who just marked requirements as accepted or rejected,
and described the reasons for rejection in a specific requirements vali-
dation document. From the 1866 requirements, 1733 were marked as
accepted, while 93 were marked as rejected.
• Patterns Application: the task was initially carried out using the
support of a tool developed by VE1 on top of GATE to facilitate the
analysis of the results. In the replication, the task was performed by
VE-A, but using solely the support of GATE.
• Quantitative Evaluation: the measures adopted to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the patterns in identifying defective requirements are tpR,
fpR, fnR, pR and rR. Intuitively, these measures indicate whether the
application of the different patterns simultaneously allows the identi-
fication of requirements that were marked as rejected by VE2. Since
VE2 did not annotate fragments, for this analysis we do not consider
evaluation measures for the single defects as in the Pilot Study.
• Qualitative Evaluation: given the poor results obtained from the
Quantitative Evaluation (see Sect. 6.3), especially in terms of precision,
this task was performed by VE1 as a non-systematic inspection of the
false negative and false positive cases. The inspection of the false
positive cases was oriented to understand whether these cases included
defective requirements not initially annotated by VE2. This evaluation
triggered the Large-scale Study – 2nd Iteration, which aimed to more
rigorously explain the poor results.
5.3.3 Large-scale Study - 2nd Iteration
Fig. 5.3 gives an outline of the iteration. The iteration involved NLP-E, VE-
A and VE1 and was performed to provide a more informed answer to RQ1
and RQ2. The iteration has an explanatory nature, in that its underlying
goal was to explain whether the false positive cases identified in the previous
iteration could be considered as true positive cases, from the point of view of
more strict annotators. To confirm the validity of the produced data, VE-A
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replicated part of the tasks. The parts replicated by VE-A are represented
in dashed line in Fig. 5.3. The tasks performed are as follows.
Patterns
Definition
Dataset
Selection
Dataset
Annotation
Patterns
Application
Output
Annotation
(VE1, VE-A)
Quantitative
Evaluation
(VE1/VE-A)
Qualitative
Evaluation
(VE-A/VE1,
NLP-E)
Research
Questions
(VE1, NLP-E)
Figure 5.3: Structure of the Large-scale Study – 2nd Iteration.
• Research Questions: RQ1 and RQ2 were considered not sufficiently
answered by the previous iteration, and the iteration was designed to
understand to which extent the low value of precision observed was
due to inaccuracies in the annotation process performed by VE2.
• Output Annotation: a second annotation process was performed on
the requirements marked as defective by at least one of the patterns.
In this annotation process, two VEs (VE1 and VE-A) independently
annotated the output of the patterns. The agreement between anno-
tators was estimated with the Cohen’s Kappa, resulting in k = 0.82,
indicating an almost perfect agreement2.
• Quantitative Evaluation: since in this analysis we focus solely on
the output produced by the patterns, we consider neither the amount
of false negative cases, nor the measure of recall. Hence, we consider
tpD, fpD, pD, for each defect class i, and tpR, fpR, pR, as measures
of the precision over requirements.
2According to [79], the following qualitative measures are associated to the different
ranges of the Cohen’s Kappa: k < 0, no agreement; 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.20, slight; 0.21 ≤ k ≤ 0.40,
fair; 0.41 ≤ k ≤ 0.60, moderate; 0.61 ≤ k ≤ 0.80 substantial; and 0.81 ≤ k ≤ 1 almost
perfect agreement.
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• Qualitative Evaluation: the task was performed by VE1 first, and
was later reviewed VE-A, to give a first categorisation of the false
positive cases. The categorisation was refined by NLP-E based on
the examples given by the VEs, with a particular focus on systematic
categories of false positives, which could be potentially discarded with
additional patterns.
5.3.4 Large-scale Study - 3rd Iteration
Fig. 5.4 gives an outline of the iteration. This iteration involved NLP-E and
VE-A, was aimed at answering RQ3, and had an improving nature. Indeed,
the goal of this iteration was to understand whether the performance of
the patterns in terms of precision could be improved with discard patterns.
To implement the foreseen improvement of the patterns, VE-A was actively
involved in the activity. Indeed, at this stage, VE1 was committed to a
mentoring program within the company, to disseminate the best practices for
requirements quality learned throughout the experience. The task performed
in this iteration are as follows.
Dataset
Selection
Dataset
Annotation
Output
Annotation
Qualitative
Evaluation
Patterns
Definition
(VE-A, NLP-E)
Patterns
Application
(VE-A)
Quantitative
Evaluation
(VE-A)
Research
Questions
(VE-A, NLP-E)
Figure 5.4: Structure of the Large-scale Study – 3rd Iteration.
• Research Questions: the Qualitative Analysis performed in the pre-
vious iteration allowed NLP-E, VE1 and VE-A to observe that a set of
systematic false positive cases could be addressed with specific patterns
designed to discard these cases (see Sect. 6.4.2). Therefore RQ3 was
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defined, and the iteration was designed to define, apply and evaluate
the discard patterns in conjunction with the defect detection patterns.
• Patterns Definition: VE-A performed a self-training, analogous to
the one performed by VE1 (i.e., a study of the selected literature,
and a tutorial on GATE) during the Pilot Study. Afterwards, VE-A
implemented the discard patterns, under the supervision of NLP-E.
The discard patterns are reported in SectION 3.4.
• Patterns Application: the patterns were applied by means of GATE.
• Quantitative Evaluation: the evaluation was performed by VE-A
considering the annotations produced in the previous Output Annota-
tion task. As in the previous iteration, the evaluation measures used
are tpD, fpD, pD, for each defect class i, and tpR, fpR, pR.
The Qualitative Evaluation was not performed, since the goal was only
to assess whether the discard patterns could improve the performance of the
overall approach in terms of precision.
5.3.5 Large-scale Study – 4th Iteration
Fig. 5.5 gives an outline of the iteration. The iteration involved NLP-E and
VE-A, and aimed to give an answer to RQ4.1. In the context of the case
study, this analysis was performed to understand whether the dictionaries of
SREE could be used to identify additional requirements defects that could
not be identified with our patterns. The nature of the iteration was again
improving, and consisted of the following tasks.
• Research Questions: the iteration was designed to compare the de-
fect detection capabilities of SREE with respect to our patterns, and
in particular, whether SREE actually allows to achieve higher values
of recall. Therefore, RQ4, and its first refinement, RQ4.1, were defined
by NLP-E and VE-A.
• Patterns Definition: under the guidance of NLP-E, each SREE dic-
tionary, as reported in Section 3.5, was imported in GATE by VE-A
as a separate Gazetteer. As mentioned, in our evaluation we apply all
the SREE dictionaries, with the exception of the dictionary of the weak
class (see Section 3.5).
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Figure 5.5: Structure of the Large-scale Study – 4th Iteration.
• Patterns Application: the patterns implementing the SREE dictio-
naries were applied by VE-A by means of GATE.
• Quantitative Evaluation: the annotations considered for these re-
quirements are those of VE2 only, from Large-scale Study – 1st Itera-
tion. Indeed, in this phase, we are interested in understanding whether
the dictionaries of SREE applied altogether are able to detect defects,
identified by VE2, that our patterns were not able to detect. To this
end, SREE is compared with our patterns according to the values of
tpR, fpR, fnR, pR, rR. The patterns considered include the defect-
detection patterns, plus the discard patterns.
• Qualitative Evaluation: this task was performed by VE-A with
the support of NLP-E in a non systematic way, to observe defective
requirements that could be detected by SREE.
5.3.6 Large-scale Study – 5th Iteration
Fig. 5.6 gives an outline of the iteration. The iteration involved NLP-E, VE-
A and VE1, and aimed to answer RQ4.2, RQ4.3 and RQ4.4. The iteration
had an explanatory nature. Indeed, from the previous iteration, a high
amount of false positive requirements was returned by SREE with respect
to our patterns. This suggests that SREE may be less precise also at the
level of defects. On the other hand, these false positive requirements may
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conceal defects that were not considered by VE2. Therefore, it was decided
to evaluate the potential degree of precision for the single defects identified
by SREE. The tasks performed in this iteration are as follows.
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(VE-A, NLP-E)
Figure 5.6: Structure of the Large-scale Study – 5th Iteration.
• Research Questions: NLP-E and VE-A considered that further in-
vestigation was required to answer RQ4, and its refinement RQ4.2, 4.3
and 4.4 were defined. Specifically, with RQ4.2 we wanted to assess
which was the precision of SREE at the level of single defects, since
low precision was observed at the level of requirements, after answering
RQ4.1. Furthermore, we wanted to systematically study the specific
defects that could be detected with SREE, and that could not be de-
tected with our patterns (RQ4.3). With RQ4.4, we wanted to provide
a qualitative evaluation of the false positive cases at the level of single
defects.
• Patterns Definition: to evaluate the false positive cases issued by
SREE at the level of defects, a selection of the SREE dictionaries was
adopted for the analysis, which we call SREE-reduced (see Sect. 3.5).
Indeed, we recall that, to address RQ4, this analysis was oriented to
understand to which extent the SREE dictionaries could complement
our patterns.
• Patterns Application: the patterns were applied by means of GATE.
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• Output Annotation: a second annotation process was performed on
the requirements marked as defective by at least one of the patterns
derived from the dictionaries of SREE. VE-A and VE1 independently
vetted the output derived from the application of SREE-reduced, and
decided whether the defects issued were true positive or false positive
cases. For each SREE defect class associated to one SREE-reduced
dictionary, all the requirements labelled as defective according to the
dictionary were considered. An exception is the plural class, for which
a sample of 50 requirements labelled as defective was randomly cho-
sen. The annotator agreement was estimated with the Cohen’s Kappa,
resulting in k = 0.79, indicating substantial agreement.
• Quantitative Evaluation the values of tpD, fpD and pD were used
for each single defect class of SREE considered.
• Qualitative Evaluation: true positive and false positive cases were
analyzed and classified by VE-A, under the supervision of NLP-E, for
each dictionary of SREE-reduced. True positives were analyzed to an-
swer RQ4.3, while false positives were analyzed to answer RQ4.4.
Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the results presentation and evaluation. The orga-
nization is made according to the RQs and the analyzed datasets.
6.2 RQ1, RQ2: Pilot Study
6.2.1 RQ1: What is the accuracy of the NLP patterns
for defect detection?
In Table 6.1 we report the results of the different evaluation measures to es-
tablish the accuracy of the patterns. We see that, although the patterns for
anaphoric ambiguity and coordination ambiguity are both based on shallow
parsing, which normally has a typical accuracy of 90-95% [71], we achieve the
objective of 100% recall. Similarly, for modal adverbs and passive voice, we
achieve 100% recall, although these patterns employ POS tagging, which has
an accuracy around 97% [83]. Two of the patterns that employ only lexical-
based pattern matching, namely missing reference and undefined term, also
achieve 100% recall. Lower values of recall are instead achieved for the pat-
terns associated to vague terms (67.74%), excessive length (60.06%), missing
unit of measurement (50%) and missing condition (97.05%).
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Defect Class tpD fpD fnD pD rD
Anaphoric ambiguity 22 8 0 73.33% 100%
Coordination ambiguity 16 8 0 66.66% 100%
Vague terms 21 16 10 56.75% 67.74%
Modal adverbs 28 14 0 66.66% 100%
Passive voice 343 60 0 85.11% 100%
Excessive length 200 30 133 86.95% 60.06%
Missing condition 66 14 2 82.5% 97.05%
Missing unit of measurement 2 2 2 50% 50%
Missing reference 10 0 0 100% 100%
Undefined term 208 76 0 73.23% 100%
Requirements tpR fpR fnR pR rR
106 59 14 64.24% 88.33%
Table 6.1: Results for single defects and requirements for the Pilot Study.
6.2.2 RQ2: Which are the cases of inaccuracy of the
NLP patterns for defect detection?
Vague terms
By inspecting the ten false negative defects for vague terms, VE1 found that
they were all due to the absence of the quantifier some in the list of vague
terms provided by QuARS. Hence, requirements such as the following were
not marked as defective by the pattern: In case the boolean logic evaluates the
permissive state, the system shall activate some redundant output – which
output shall be activated? The problem was resolved by simply adding the
term some to the list of vague terms. Since also pD was particularly low
(56.75%), VE1 inspected the false positives and saw that they were due to
domain-specific terms, namely raw data, hard disk, short-circuit, logical
or, logical and, green LED. These terms were used to discard false positives
in future analysis.
Excessive length
By inspecting the false negative cases for excessive length, VE1 saw that
they were due to a limitation of the GATE Tokenizer. For nested bullet
point lists, the Tokenizer considers each item as a separate sentence. Hence,
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very long and deeply nested bullet point lists were not considered as sentences
of excessive length. However, VE1 also argued that the length of a sentence,
and the hard readability due to complex nested lists are different kinds of
defects. Hence, she decided not to change the pattern for excessive length,
and to consider the problem of nested lists as a defect that, at the moment,
was left uncovered.
Missing unit of measurement
Concerning the two false negative cases for missing unit of measurement,
VE1 observed that these were due to the presence of ranges of numerical
values (e.g., [4,20]) without the specification of the unit of measurement.
To address these cases, the pattern was adjusted.
Missing condition
The two false negative cases for missing condition appeared to be due to
the presence of multiple if statements in the same sentence, with one else
statement only, as in the following case: “If the initialization starts, if the
board is plugged in and if the operator has sent the running command the
system shall start, else it shall go in failure mode”. For requirements as the
one presented, it is difficult to understand which specific if is covered by the
else statement. Since the large majority of missing condition defects were
identified (66 out of 68), and considering that the norm EN-50128 requires
anyway a manual review [26], VE1 decided not to add additional rules for
this defect class. It could be noticed that the specific defect could be detected
also with techniques that check the readability of the text [34], an emerging
topic in requirements [48], which is however outside of the scope of this
paper.
False negative requirements
It is also useful to look at the values of false negative cases fnR and recall rR
for the requirements. These 14 false negative cases not only include those
already discussed, but also cases of defective requirements that could not
be identified with our patterns – but which were annotated following the
guidelines of the company. In particular, interesting cases are those in which
we have inconsistent requirements (e.g., 1: “The system shall accept only
read access to file X”; 2: “The system shall accept read and write access to
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file X”.) that violate guideline (f), which asks requirements to be consistent.
Other cases are those for which we have problems of testability (guideline
(b)), as in the case of under-specified statements (e.g., “The system shall
go in error mode when an internal asynchronism has been detected”; asyn-
chronism among which components?), or incomplete statements (e.g., “The
system shall make available its internal status”; through which interface?).
Finally, other cases are those associated to other defects of completeness of
the requirements document, as in the case of requirements for which it is
expressed only the best-case scenario, and not the worst-case (e.g., “The
system shall go at runtime state from power off state in 3 minutes in the
best case.”; which is the requirement for the worst case?). Although some
false negative cases were found, the evaluation of the patterns was considered
successful in terms of recall by VE1. Hence, we decided to experiment the
use of the patterns on a larger requirements dataset.
6.3 RQ1, RQ2: Large-scale Study – 1st Itera-
tion
6.3.1 RQ1: What is the accuracy of the NLP patterns
for defect detection?
In Table 6.3 we report the output of the patterns on the dataset in terms
of defects identified (D), and in terms of defective requirements (R) – the
other columns of the table will be discussed in Section 6.4.
We see that the majority of the defects are due to passive voice. This is in
line with the results of [47]. The use of passive voice appears to be a sort of
writing style of these requirements, since 824 out of 1866 (44%) include this
defect. However, the most interesting – and disappointing – aspect comes
from the evaluation presented in Table 6.2. The number of false positive
requirements is extremely high, and the precision is only 5.81%. This value
is comparable with the precision obtained through a random predictor (for
which pR = rR = 93/1866% = 5%, see [3]). Hence, it appears not acceptable
if the tool needs to be used in a real-world setting. Furthermore, also the
value of rR (85.39%) is slightly lower if compared with the one obtained in
our preliminary study, for which rR = 88.33%.
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tpR fpR fnR pR rR
76 1232 13 5.81% 85.39%
Table 6.2: Results for the Large-scale Study – 1st Iteration.
6.3.2 RQ2: Which are the cases of inaccuracy of the
NLP patterns for defect detection?
In this iteration, we give general observations of false negative cases, which
impact the value of rR, and false positive cases, which impact on pR. Given
the low value of pR observed, the evaluation of false positives, and their
classification was systematically performed during Large-scale Study – 2nd
Iteration (Section 6.4).
False negative cases
As for the preliminary analysis, the false negative cases are due to require-
ments that include defects that were not considered by any of the patterns,
but that violate one or more criteria adopted by the company. Interest-
ing examples are requirements that do not fulfill the criterion of testability
(guideline (b)) (e.g., “The system shall be in continuous operation for 24
hours a day and 7 days a week”); requirements that are not feasible (guide-
line (a)) (e.g., “The core of the system shall use TCP/IP protocol in order to
communicate with peripheral boards” – in this case, this requirement was con-
sidered not feasible since the only communication protocol that was consid-
ered applicable was UDP); requirements that include inconsistent statements
(guideline (f)) (e.g., “The brake symbol shall be able to show the following
colors: Green when the brake is not active, Grey when the brake is not ac-
tive”). Overall, these cases show that there is a variety of defects of semantic
nature that are hardly identifiable with the applied NLP techniques – which
focus on lexical and syntactic aspects –, and hence require a human expert
to accurately assess them.
False positive cases
VE1 inspected the output of the tool, and saw that part of the false pos-
itive requirements were actually defective. For example, the following re-
quirement marked as accepted, was evidently defective due to several vague
terms (highlighted in bold): “Depending on the technical or functional
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solution selected, there shall be time parameters in the control system, that
the Purchaser shall be able to adjust during operation in order for the reg-
istration/deregistration to be made as effectively as possible”.1 In other
terms, the intuition was that the initial annotation (by VE2) actually tol-
erated several linguistic defects, and marked as rejected only those require-
ments that appeared to include severe conceptual defects. When consulted,
the VE2 observed that he also had an in-depth knowledge of the design of
the requirements, which allowed him to disambiguate, or tolerate, certain
defects. To assess how many of the false positive cases could be considered
as linguistic defects from the point of view of a more strict annotator that
did not have prior knowledge of the project, a second annotation process
was performed to evaluate the false positive cases (Large-scale Study – 2nd
Iteration, Section 5.3.3).
6.4 RQ1, RQ2: Large-scale Study – 2nd Itera-
tion
6.4.1 RQ1: What is the accuracy of the NLP patterns
for defect detection?
Table 6.3 reports the results of this phase. For each defect class, the precision
reaches an average value of 72.81% for what concerns the number of defects
(average of different pD). Overall pR resulting from the application of all the
patterns together, raises from the 5.81% of Table 6.2, to 77.37%.
6.4.2 RQ2: Which are the cases of inaccuracy of the
NLP patterns for defect detection?
From the results presented in the previous section, there is still a significant
amount of false positive cases that should be noticed. Part of these cases
are systematic, and they can be discarded with additional patterns. Here we
will discuss relevant examples of false positive cases for each class, specifically
focusing on the systematic cases, and mentioning non-systematic ones when
this is considered relevant.
1The requirement was not rejected since it was clarified by other subsequent require-
ments. This violates the guideline (c) that require requirements to be stand-alone, but
the defect was not considered crucial.
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Defect Class D R tpD fpD pD
Anaphoric ambiguity 391 342 198 193 50.64%
Coordination ambiguity 261 215 190 71 72.80%
Vague terms 857 580 392 465 45.74%
Modal adverbs 478 379 333 145 69.67%
Passive voice 1317 824 888 429 67.43%
Excessive length 13 13 13 0 100%
Missing condition 185 147 127 58 68.65%
Missing unit of measurement 0 0 0 0 -
Missing reference 2 1 2 0 100%
Undefined term 61 57 49 12 80.33%
Average 72.81%
Requirements
tpR fpR pR
1012 296 77.37%
Table 6.3: Results for the Large-scale Study – 2nd Iteration.
Anaphoric ambiguity
The majority of the false positive cases for anaphoric ambiguities are due
to the usage of the pronoun it in its impersonal form, especially in the
expression “It shall be possible [...]”. This expression, and its variants – it
shall also be possible, it should be possible, etc. – is often used as a preamble
in the requirements of the company. These cases are systematic sources of
false positives, and appropriate patterns can be defined to discard them.
The remaining, non-systematic cases, include situations in which the ref-
erent of the pronoun is disambiguated by the context, as in the following
requirement:“Trains that arrive on the automatically controlled stretches
shall continue to be directed to their correct destinations”. The pronoun
their is clearly referred to the trains, since only trains and not stretches have
a destination attribute, but the pattern PANA recognises two nouns (i.e.,
trains and stretches), to which the pronoun may refer. To detect these non-
systematic false positive cases, machine learning approaches, such as those
applied in Yang et al. [118] should be applied.
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Coordination ambiguity
The false positive cases for coordination ambiguity, in line with those iden-
tifyied in Chantree et al. [28], are non-systematic cases, in which the poten-
tially ambiguous fragment is disambiguated by the context. For example,
consider a requirement such as: “It shall be possible to print out the whole
timetable or part of it”, in which the fragment in bold is detected by
means of pattern PCO2 . In this requirement, it is clear that the adjective
whole refers solely to the noun timetable. Similarly, consider the following
requirement: “A train can consist of one, two or three cars for ser-
vices between Station A and Station B”, in which the fragment in bold
is detected by means of pattern PCO1 . Also in this case, it is clear that
the conjunctions and and or refer to their nearby terms. However, these
cases are non-systematic, and can hardly be detected by means of rule-based
patterns. Other heuristics, such as those presented by Chantree et al. [28]
should be used.
Vague terms
A large number of false positive cases (465) is identified for this defect. These
cases can be partitioned into the following typical situations:
1. Lexical Ambiguity: the vague term is lexically ambiguous [12]. For
example, the term light, considered as adjective, is vague, but when
playing the role of noun, as in the requirement “Yellow Stop lights
do not have to be monitored”, is not vague. Cases such as the one in
this example can be systematically detected by applying POS tagging,
and considering a term as vague only if it plays the role of adjective.
A similar systematic case, which can be addressed with the same ap-
proach, is the case of the term sound, as in the requirement fragment
“Blue arrows, and their associated sound, shall not be presented to the
driver [...]”;
2. Domain-specific Term: a vague word is part of a domain-specific
multi-word term, as for the term distant of the following example: “The
operator shall use “distant signalling distance” to apply the brake”.
Another interesting case is the term near in the typical railway expres-
sion near miss – indicating an unplanned event that has the potential
to cause, but does not actually result in human injury. To discard
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these cases, techniques for multi-word term identification [15] may be
applied. Otherwise, a list of stop phrases to be ignored can be defined
based on the false positives identified. In our case, this second option
will be chosen;
3. Accepted Expressions: the term possible is used in the phrase “It
shall be possible [...]”, considered an accepted requirement preamble
within the company, as previously mentioned;
4. Internal Clarification: the vague term is later clarified with the
specification of numerical quantities, as in the following fragment: “[...]
for a short stretch (maximum 3 meters) on tramcars [...]”. In this
case, the term short is clarified by the phrase maximum 3 meters;
5. Domain Clarification: the vague term is clarified by the domain,
as in the case of the term adjacent in the following requirement: “In
the case of a train passing adjacent to a level crossing, each train
shall register its own priority”. Physical adjacency among elements in
the railway line is a well defined concept in the domain. However, we
found also cases in which the term adjacent was considered vague, as
in the fragment adjacent track, in which it is not specified whether
the referenced track is on the left-hand or on the right-hand side.
The first three cases can be systematically detected. By contrast, the
last two are hard to be detected in a systematic manner. Indeed, apart from
case 4, patterns that check numerical quantities nearby the vague term can
be defined, but it is not sure how “nearby” should be intended. In addition,
these false positive cases are rather easy to discard, and, for this reason,
patterns will not be defined to address these cases.
Modal adverbs
For modal adverbs the great majority of the false positive cases are due to
the usage of the terms manually and automatically. These terms are not
considered defective in the context of the requirements, since they are used
to distinguish between the duties of the system (automatically), and the
duties of the operator (manually). The remaining false positive cases are
due to the usage of the term only. Consider the following requirement: “In
case there are two coupled points the system shall select only the point with
identifier equal to 1”. Here, the term only is used to distinguish between
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multiple choices. Since the term only, especially when misplaced, may be
ambiguous [12], the usage of this term cannot be regarded as a systematic
source of false positives. An exception in this sense is the occurrence of only
in the fragment information purposes only, an expression frequently used in
the requirements. When only occurs in this fragment, it can be considered
as a systematic false positive case.
Passive voice
For the false positive cases of this class, we can identify four typical situa-
tions, listed below:
1. Irrelevant Actor: the actor performing the action is sometimes con-
sidered as not relevant, as in the requirement: “Air conditioning units
are installed in some of the technical equipment areas”. This sentence
provides information about a certain environment, and the reader does
not need to know who installed the air conditioning units. Similar cases
are those in which the passive voice is connected, or is disconnected are
used;
2. Implicit Actor: the actor – often, the system or the operator – can
be inferred from the context, as in “Error signals shall be displayed
in the MMI above the speedometer” (the actor is the system), or “The
emergency brake restore shall be performed with the green signal” (the
actor is the operator);
3. Explicit Actor: the actor is actually expressed, as the passive voice
is used in conjunction with prepositions (e.g., by, from), after which
the actor is clarified, as in the following example: “All views shall be
developed by the Supplier in consultation with the Purchaser”;
4. Intransitive Verb: the passive voice is used with intransitive verbs,
such as the verb log-in (e.g., “If a workstation fails and the operator
is still logged in [...]”).
The first two cases cannot be identified systematically. However, the
latter two can be, in principle, identified with appropriate patterns, which
detect the prepositions by and from in conjunction with passive voice (case
3), or which identify intransitive verbs (case 4). However, since the number
of these cases was considered negligible, these two discard patterns were not
implemented.
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Missing condition
False positives for this defect class occur when the term if is not used to
express a condition over the system behaviour. For example, the requirement
“The system shall check if there is a train in the route” does not require an
else statement. In other cases, the else condition is expressed in another
requirement (e.g., 1: “If the precondition satisfies all initialization check the
system shall set its internal state to running”; 2: “In case an initilization
check fails, the system shall set its internal state to failure”). These cases can
hardly be detected with patterns, and require the knowledge of the context
to be disambiguated.
Undefined term
The entirety of the false positive cases for undefined terms are due to the
identification of units of measures, or known acronyms in their plural forms
(e.g., kVA, dB, LEDs). A list of known unit of measurement and known
acronyms can easily be defined to discard these cases.
6.5 RQ3: Large-scale Study – 3rd Iteration
6.5.1 RQ3: What is the precision of NLP patterns for
defect detection when complemented with discard
patterns?
Table 6.4 reports the results obtained when applying the discard patterns.
To ease the comparison with Table 6.3 we report, for the improved rows,
the previous results in italics. We notice a substantial increase, in terms of
pD. In particular, compared with the results of Table 6.3, pD increases by
22.69% for anaphoric ambiguity, by 24.89% for vague terms, by 11.75% for
modal adverbs, and by 17.67% for undefined term. Overall, the average pD
raises to 81.36% (an increase of 8.55% with respect to Table 6.3), and also
pR increases by a non negligible 5.79%. This increase of precision saves, in
principle, a considerable amount of checks to the Verification Engineer, who
has to vet a lower number of requirements. More specifically, if we look at
the values of fpR in Table 6.4 (296) and in Table 6.3 (205), we see that 91
requirements do not have to be vetted after the introduction of the discard
patterns.
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Defect Class D R tpD fpD pD
270 251 198 72 73.33%
Anaphoric ambiguity
391 342 198 193 50.64%
Coordination ambiguity 261 215 190 71 72.80%
555 384 392 163 70.63%
Vague terms
857 580 392 465 45.74%
409 330 333 76 81.42%
Modal adverbs
478 379 333 145 69.67%
Passive voice 1317 824 888 429 67.43%
Excessive length 13 13 13 0 100%
Missing condition 185 147 127 58 68.65%
Missing unit of measurement 0 0 0 0 -
Missing reference 2 1 2 0 100%
50 47 49 1 98%
Undefined term
61 57 49 12 80.33%
Average
81.36%
72.81%
Requirements
tpR fpR pR
1012 205 83.16%
1012 296 77.37%
Table 6.4: Results for the Large-scale Study – 3rd Iteration.
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As noticed in Section 6.4, the majority of the remaining false positive
cases cannot be systematically detected, and require the judgment of a hu-
man assessor. These types of situations can be potentially addressed through
statistical techniques (e.g., [28] and [118]). Typical examples have already
been reported in Section 6.4.
6.6 RQ4.1: Large-scale Study – 4th Iteration
6.6.1 RQ4.1: What is the accuracy of SREE with re-
spect to the NLP patterns for defect detection
complemented with discard patterns?
Table 6.5 compares the performance of the SREE dictionaries and our pat-
terns against the initial annotations of VE2. From the table, we see that
SREE outperforms our patterns by 11.24% in terms of recall on the require-
ments, while its precision is 0.79% lower. Hence, SREE dictionaries may
contain terms that help to identify defective requirements that were not de-
tected through our patterns, and were therefore part of the false negative
cases issued. On the other hand, a 0.79% gap in terms of precision, implies
that 351 additional false positive requirements (fpR) are generated by SREE
with respect to our patterns. The obtained results confirm that SREE meets
its aim to reach 100% recall, even at the cost of a lower precision.
Let us first analyze the false negative cases of our patterns that are de-
tected through the SREE dictionaries, and then we will investigate the issue
of precision.
Tool tpR fpR fnR pR rR
SREE 86 1492 3 5.45% 96.63%
Patterns 76 1141 13 6.24% 85.39%
Table 6.5: Results for the Large-scale Study – 4th Iteration, SREE vs Pat-
terns.
A representative example of the requirements detected through SREE,
and not with our patterns, is the following one: “Normal and abnormal
changes in the status of the Facility shall warrant special treatment [...]”.
VE2 in his initial annotation rejected the requirement, and stated that “Nor-
mal and abnormal changes” are not defined and shall be agreed. SREE iden-
80 Results
tifies this requirement as defective, since its dictionary for the vague class
includes the term normal. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that SREE
dictionaries do not include the term abnormal, which is also a defective term,
according to the statements of VE2. A similar case is the following require-
ment: “When the driver follows indications as to the maximum speed limit
the Facility shall not cause braking that produces jolty and uneven driving”.
The requirement was marked as rejected, because it does not fulfill the crite-
rion of testability (guideline (b)). This is due to the presence of the adjectives
maximum, jolty and uneven. Here, the SREE dictionaries correctly detects
the vague term maximum, but do not detect the defective terms jolty and
uneven. Hence, although including the SREE dictionaries in our patterns
can help to increase the recall, novel terms may be needed in the future to
address other, previously unseen, defects.
Another interesting aspect concerns other requirements that:
1. are marked as defective by SREE;
2. are marked as rejected by VE2 in the initial annotation;
3. the cause of the rejection is not the defect indicated by SREE.
Exemplary cases are mostly related to the usage of plurals, which have 3377
occurrences in 1250 requirements (see Table 6.6, discussed in Section 6.7). An
example is the following requirement: “It shall be possible to turn trains at
the intended turning points without restriction”. SREE identifies the source
of the defect in the plural term trains. However, VE2 marked the requirement
as rejected because it violates the criterion of testability (guideline (b)).
This is due to the expression without restriction, which does not allow the
definition of a finite number of tests to verify the requirement.
Of course, there are entire defect classes considered by our patterns, which
are not detected by the dictionaries of SREE, such as passive voice, missing
condition, missing reference, missing unit of measurement, etc. Given these
observations, SREE dictionaries can be considered as complementary to our
patterns. Still, SREE and our patterns altogether are insufficient to detect
all the potential defects, and should be complemented with additional terms
(e.g., jolty and uneven).
As mentioned, a high amount of false positive requirements was returned
by SREE with respect to our patterns. This suggests that SREE may be less
precise also at the level of defects. On the other hand, these false positive
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cases may conceal defects that were not considered by VE2 during the initial
annotation.
Therefore, it was decided to evaluate the potential degree of precision for
the single defects identified by SREE. An analysis of the false positive cases
was performed at the level of the single defects, similar to the one applied
on the output of our patterns during Large-scale Study – 2nd Iteration.
6.7 RQ4.2, RQ4.3, RQ4.4: Large-scale Study
– 5th Iteration
6.7.1 RQ4.2: What is the precision of SREE for the
defects in its scope?
Table 6.6 reports the results of the analysis of the false positive defects. The
average value of pD is 11.29%, which indicates that a large amount of false
positive cases are issued, which is much lower, compared with the 81.36%
obtained through our patterns (Section 6.6)2.
6.7.2 RQ4.3, RQ4.4: Which additional defects can be
identified with SREE, and which are the false pos-
itive cases?
Below, we provide an analysis of the true positive and false positive cases.
Continuance
The continuance class includes terms that, when present, indicate a reference
between a statement and a previous one (e.g., in addition, in particular), or
a subsequent one (e.g., following, below). True positive cases occur when the
referred statement is absent, and, therefore, the requirement is incomplete.
The number of these cases is not negligible, and are all associated to the
terms as follows and below. False negative cases occur anytime the referred
statement appear in the requirement. These cases occur especially when the
2The value of pR that considers the analysis of the false positive cases for the SREE
dictionaries cannot be provided, since we analyzed only a subset of the defects for the
plurals class. However, the average value of pD gives a clear indication of the precision of
SREE at the level of defects.
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Defect Class D R tpD fpD pD
Continuance 181 155 41 140 22.65%
Directive 123 102 0 123 0%
Optional 102 92 26 76 25.49%
Incomplete 32 31 2 30 6.25%
Plural 3377 1250 6 125 4.58%
Quantifier 308 264 25 283 8.11%
Vague 931 665 111 820 11.92%
Average 11.29%
Table 6.6: Results for the Large-scale Study – 5th Iteration.
referent is a previous statement, and the terms in addition and in particular
are used.
Directive
The directive class includes terms that indicate the presence of a reference
to an element in the requirement (e.g., e.g., i.e.) or in the document (e.g.,
figure, table). As for the continuance class, true positives may occur when
the referred element is absent, while false positive occur when the referred
element is present. In the considered requirements, no true positive case was
identified.
Incomplete
The incomplete class includes terms that may indicate a form of internal
incompleteness of the requirement (e.g., TBD, to be defined). The dictionary
of this class raises a limited number of defects (32). Indeed, expressions as
TBA and TBD do not occur in the requirements, and the great majority of
the false positive cases occur when the term in addition is used – a term that
is included also in the continuance class. Another typical case of false positive
is the following requirement fragment: “[...] functions shall be performed in
a secure way, as defined in the CTC security requirements”. Here, the
requirement is not incomplete, since it refers to another document in which
the required information is available. Instead, the cases evaluated as true
positives are similar to the following one: “All alarms [...] shall be shown in
track plan views as specified above”. Here, the problem is with the term
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above, rather than with the term as specified, since the involved subjects
could not find the referred information in the document. However, the defect
was considered a true positive by the involved subjects, since the tagging of
the term as specified allowed the identification of the defect.
Optional
The optional class includes terms that indicate subjective optionality. Any-
time an expression such as if needed, if necessary, if appropriate occurred,
this was marked as a true positive case. Similarly, many true positive cases
occur with the term either, as in the requirement: “A cable run shall be laid
on either side of the track”.
False positive cases occur when terms such as either, or neither, are used
in the expressions either [...] or , or neither [...] nor. Another typical,
systematic false positive case occurs with the usage of the term in case of,
when this expresses a condition that depends on actions that are external to
the system, as in: “In case of a restart of the system [...]”.
Plurals
Plurals are ambiguous when they are used to describe a property of a set,
and it is not clear if the property is that of each element or of the whole set
[13], as in the requirement fragment “[...] printers shall have a sound [...]”.
In the considered sample of 50 defective requirements for the plurals class,
cases such as this one were extremely rare. A large amount of false positive
cases was instead observed.
Typical false positive cases belong to two classes. The first class includes
lexically ambiguous verbs used in third person singular form (e.g., means,
passes, leaves). The second class includes cases in which the plural term
indicates a set of objects or subjects, such as trains, boards, tracks, operators,
etc., and it is clear from the context that the requirement refer to all the
elements in the set, as in the following fragment: “Control orders that are
executed by operators shall be registered [...]”. Since the requirements are
high-level system requirements, the use of plurals in the form exemplified is
rather common, and accepted by the involved subjects.
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Quantifier
Quantifiers that express quantities in a vague form such as few, little, many,
are included in the quantifier class. The occurrence in the requirements of
these vague terms was always considered by the involved subjects as a true
positive defect. False positive cases are due to universal quantifiers, such as
all or any. Indeed, although, as noted by [13], these terms may be source of
ambiguity (e.g., “All lights have a switch” – one switch for each light, or a
common switch?), in the considered requirements these terms are not used
in ambiguous forms. Instead, non ambiguous requirements fragments such
as the following are common: “[...] all equipped tramcars [...] shall be able
to operate on all track networks [...]”.
Vague
The vague class includes additional terms with respect to the Vague dictio-
nary of our patterns. Part of these terms appear to be useful to identify
extremely vague requirements that were not identified through our patterns.
A representative example is the following requirement, which includes two
vague expressions: “Communication shall as far as possible be redundant,
with separate cable runs, for the various communication links.” False posi-
tive cases are mainly due to the usage of terms such as also, and but, which
are rather frequent in the requirements, but are not considered sources of
vagueness by the involved subjects. Indeed, the presence of these terms
sometimes indicates that a requirement includes more than one statement,
as in the fragment: “The [...] system shall not be reused but shall be disman-
tled [...]”. However, since the considered requirements are high-level system
requirements, the VEs accepted these situations.
6.8 General Observations
From this analysis, we see that additional defects, which were not previously
considered by the involved subjects, are actually detected thanks to SREE.
This confirms that SREE may play a complementary role with respect to
our patterns. On the other hand, the value of precision of SREE, at the level
of defects, is poorer than the precision of our patterns (i.e., a larger number
of false positive cases is issued). However, this numerical difference should
be considered with care. Indeed, there are two main reasons that explain
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and justify this result:
1. SREE Philosophy: the philosophy of SREE, as we interpret it through
its usage, is to identify terms that, when present, may also indicate that
a defect may be present. If the defect is not present, it is easy for the
analyst to vet the requirement. Representative examples in this sense
are the terms in the continuance class: terms such as as follows and be-
low were judged as particularly useful by the VEs to detect incomplete
requirements, although their occurrence was not always associated to a
defect. The VEs said that vetting the false positive cases was straight-
forward for this class. Hence, the low value of precision was sufficiently
counter-balanced by the usefulness of the terms included in the defect
class;
2. Subset of SREE: a subset of SREE dictionaries was used, instead
of the whole SREE. Hence, the comparison cannot be considered com-
plete. However, our goal in this case study was not to identify the
best tool for defect detection, but rather to investigate whether ad-
ditional defects could be found by means of the SREE dictionaries.
This goal also mitigates a potential annotators’ bias that may have
occurred in the evaluation of the false positives of SREE dictionaries.
Although this bias cannot be totally eliminated in the context of our
case study, our patterns, as well as the SREE dictionaries, are avail-
able for the research community, who can independently compare the
different strategies.
6.9 Threats to Validity
In this section, we discuss threats to validity according to the structure
recommended in [103].
6.9.1 Construct Validity
Objective and widely used metrics (i.e., precision and recall) were used in
this work to assess the accuracy of the adopted NLP technologies. To derive
measures of precision and recall, subjective evaluations were performed by
VE-A, VE1, and VE2 during the Dataset Annotation and Output Anno-
tation tasks. In the Pilot Study, only VE1 annotated the dataset, and no
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countermeasure was taken to assess the validity of the annotation, given the
preliminary nature of the study. Similarly, in the Large-scale Study – 1st
Iteration, only VE2 annotated D-Large, and the same annotation was used
for the Large-scale Study – 4th Iteration. On the one hand, also in the real-
world context of the company, requirements review is performed by a single
subject, and the subjectivity threat can be considered as partially mitigated
by the realism of this annotation. On the other hand, the Output Annota-
tion on D-Large, was independently performed by VE1 and VE-A, and the
inter-rater agreement was computed by means of the Cohen’s Kappa. The
agreement resulted in k = 0.82 (almost perfect) for Large-scale Study – 2nd
Iteration, and k = 0.79 for Large-scale Study – 5th Iteration (substantial).
Therefore, we believe that the threat is further mitigated by these measures
of agreement, at least for those requirements that were produced as output
by the NLP patterns. Therefore, construct validity threats are mitigated for
Large-scale Study – 2nd, 3rd and 5th Iteration, while they are only partially
mitigated for Pilot Study, and Large-scale Study – 1st and 4th Iteration, in
which only one subject was involved in the annotation process.
6.9.2 Internal Validity
The main threats to the internal validity of the study are due to the per-
sonal objectives of the involved subjects, which may have had an impact
on the results. Indeed, the annotations performed by VE1 and VE-A in
the tasks in which they were involved may be biased by their need to show
that the implemented patterns were successful, hence annotating as defective
also requirements that were not. In the case of the Pilot Study, this threat
is mitigated by the fact that the annotation was performed before applying
the patterns, and hence without exactly knowing their output. In the Large-
scale Study iterations, the threat is mitigated by (a) by the pragmatics of the
case study, and (b) the independent Output Annotation process performed.
Indeed, since VE1 works as VE in the company, she is also interested on
improving her job, besides showing that the implemented technology is ef-
fective. VE-A may be less keen to this type of integrity, since she is not part
of the company anymore. However, since the Output Annotation task was
always performed independently by the two VEs, we argue that this threat
is sufficiently controlled. Furthermore, as noticed in Section 6.8, since this
threat cannot be totally mitigated, we share our patterns so that other re-
searchers can apply them to their contexts, and check their effectiveness. It
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should be noted that the annotations of VE2 are not subject to this threat,
since they were performed before this work was conceived. Validity issues
related to the discrepancies between the annotations performed by VE2 com-
pared to the ones of VE-A and V1, are discussed in Section 6.9.3, since we
argue that the annotations represent different contexts, from which different
generalization criteria may apply.
Another internal validity threat is associated to the tool-suite initially
used by VE1 in the Large-scale Study – 1st and 2nd Iterations, to compute
the data for the case. Indeed, she used an internally developed tool on top of
GATE to produce the results. To mitigate potentially unsound manipulation
of the data by this prototype tool, part of Large-scale Study – 1st and 2nd
Iterations, were replicated by VE-A, with the support of GATE only. Dis-
crepancies in the results were observed, and root causes were analyzed. The
rest of the analysis were performed by means of GATE only. Since GATE
is a widely used tool – see the list of companies using GATE3 and, e.g., [6]
and [38], for relevant scientific works in which GATE was employed –, we
believe that the results produced with its support are correct.
6.9.3 External Validity
Our discussion on the external validity of the study is loosely based on the
principles of case-based generalization [115], and of similarity-based gener-
alization [60]. Specifically, we describe the main architectural aspects of
our study, i.e., domain, requirements, subjects, that can be considered as
a term of comparison for other studies. In this way, other researchers and
practitioners can reason by analogy, and possibly profit from our results [60].
• Domain: our study covers a company of a specific domain, i.e., the
railway domain. In Europe, railway companies have to follow the gen-
eral guidelines of the CENELEC norms [26], and their work practices
at process level can be considered comparable. Furthermore, the rail-
way domain is characterized by a limited number of suppliers, who
often deal with the same customers – i.e., the national or private rail-
way companies, who provide infrastructure, and services to passengers.
This increases the homogenisation of processes and, in part, require-
ments documents. While we cannot generalise our results for any type
3https://gate.ac.uk/commercial.html
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of domain, we argue that similar results may be obtained in other rail-
way companies. On the other hand, the following limitations to the
external validity of our results shall be considered.
• Requirements: the requirements considered in the study have been se-
lected by VE1, with the support of the company, as benchmarks to
represent typically defective requirements of the firm. VE1 and VE-
A admits that, depending on the subjects involved in the production
of requirements, the documents may have different degrees of qual-
ity, and the documents belonging to the study are requirements of
lower quality than average. Furthermore, along the process, system
requirements such as those analyzed are normally refined into lower
level requirements. Hence, the results produced shall be considered
representative for (a) system requirements, (b) requirements with a
poor degree of quality. Since the requirements concerns several types
of railway signalling systems, they are sufficiently representative of the
types of product developed in railways.
• Subjects: Overall, three VEs were involved in this study. The sample
is limited, but it shall be considered that all the VEs are normally
subject to the same company practices and process, and can therefore
be considered representative VEs for the company. Considering the
characteristics of the railway domain mentioned above, they can be
considered, to a certain extent, also representative of VEs in railways.
The task of annotating is all but simple; the high number of require-
ments to be tagged and the repetitiveness of the task may cause a
loss of focus after a while. Discrepancies were observed between the
annotations performed by VE2 on D-Large during Large-scale Study –
1st Iteration, and the annotations on the output of the patterns per-
formed by VE1 and VE-A, during Large-scale Study – 2nd Iteration.
In principle, the discrepancies may be associated to the different de-
gree of experience of the subjects. VE1 and VE-A had 3 and 2 years
experience, respectively, while VE2 had 10 years of experience. We
believe that the discrepancies observed are only partially associated
to the experience. Instead, we believe that the discrepancies are due
to the differences in terms of contextual knowledge, and goals. VE2
had in in-depth knowledge of the project that allowed him to disam-
biguate, or tolerate, certain defects, and focused on severe conceptual
problems. Instead, VE1 and VE-A did not have any prior knowledge
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on the project, and focused on linguistic aspects, given the research-
based, exploratory nature of their work.
For these reasons, the different iterations have different degrees of ex-
ternal validity – notwithstanding the construct validity threats already
discussed. Specifically, Pilot Study, and Large-scale Study – 2nd, 3rd,
and 5th Iterations can be considered representative for those cases in
which the annotation is performed by VEs who do not have prior
knowledge of the project of the requirements, and focus on linguis-
tics defects. Instead, Large-scale Study – 2nd and 4th Iterations are
representative for those cases in which the annotation is performed by
a VE who has an in-depth knowledge of the project, and focuses on
conceptual defects.
As mentioned, our results can be generalised to other domains only to a
limited extent. Our work focusses on a single railway company, and railway
companies have a well-defined processes to follow, that is not shared by
other context. The degree of rigour of the railway process is comparable to
the one employed in the avionic sector, in which the DO-178C norm applies
for software development [102]. However, the products developed in railways
and avionics are highly different, and use domain specific terminology. Many
of our patterns are domain independent, but, given the large variability of
NL, and of domain specific NLs, the generalisation of our results to other
domains requires further research.
6.9.4 Reliability
The results provided are mainly quantitative, and we argue that a common
understanding on their meaning was achieved when the values of precision
and recall had to be computed. Concerning the qualitative data, these were
provided by the VEs and were refined with the support of NLP-E. We argue
that this interaction increased the reliability of the qualitative results.
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Chapter 7
Lessons learned and future
research issues
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a set of lessons learned from our experience and
the future research directions emerged.
7.2 Domain-customisable NLP Tools
Our experience shows that NLP technologies are available for requirements
analysts with limited NLP training, and that these technologies can be pro-
ficiently used for the detection of several typical requirements defects. Rule-
based NLP patterns tend to generate large numbers of false positives [28,
118]. If the results come from a tool that the requirements analyst cannot
control, the analyst is likely to distrust the tool. Instead, if the analyst un-
derstands the inherent principles of the tool – and implementing the tool
is a proper way for understanding its principles –, they can understand its
weaknesses and use it at its best. Furthermore, it is also important that do-
main experts develop the tools since, to reduce the amount of false positive
cases, tailoring the patterns for the specific needs of the domain is required.
If the VEs implement the patterns, they can customise them according to
the language used in the domain to take into account terms such as raw
data, hard disk (Section 6.2), and phrases such as it shall be possible (Sec-
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tion 6.4). The introduction of the discard patterns, to remove systematic
false positive cases, allowed an increase of the average pD from 72.81% to
81.36% (Section 6.4). It should be noticed that, if a company defines a set
of patterns to be applied for defect detection, a maintenance cost should be
taken into account since, as any software tool, patterns may need to evolve.
While for COTS tools the software house who develops them takes care of
their evolution, and maintenance costs, the company has to take the burden
of maintenance in case of internally developed tools.
7.2.1 Requirements language counts
Looking at the large number of passive voice defects in Large-scale Study
– 2nd Iteration, it appeared that the use of passive voice was a form of
writing style. As a consequence, the patterns generated a large number of
detected defects (i.e., 1317). This tells us that, to effectively use NLP, one
cannot simply implement appropriate defect detection patterns: one should
change also the language adopted in the requirements, to make it more error
free, so that the VEs can focus on a smaller amount of defects. For this
reason, we argue that NLP tools should be firstly used by the requirements
engineers, to limit the amount of poor writing style, and only afterwards
by the VEs. However, this is not always practicable, especially in those
cases in which requirements are produced by the customer, and assessed
by the company who has to develop the product. As acknowledged by the
company, the requirements considered in this study are particularly rich in
defects, also with respect to other requirements of the company. However, it
is worth noting that, after taking inspiration from the work of Terzakis and
Gregory [110], VE1 is currently involved in a mentoring program within the
company, to educate the requirements engineers towards the production of
higher quality requirements.
7.2.2 Requirements level counts
During the analysis of the false positive cases of SREE, a large number
of plurals (3377) was identified, which were tolerated in most of the cases.
Furthermore, also the presence of conjunctions such as also and but, which
indicate non-atomic requirements, was tolerated in these requirements. This
was motivated by the level of the requirements. The considered dataset was
composed of high-level system requirements for which, according to the VEs,
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a certain degree of generality can be accepted. These requirements will be
refined into lower-level technical requirements, along the development life-
cycle, for which a greater degree of precision is expected. Also the cost of
a defective requirement is different depending on its level: high level defects
have a greater impact on the lifecycle, while low level defects have a smaller
one. Specifically, the detected defects generate change requests for the prod-
uct that have a different management cost (in terms of hours of rework and
required money) depending on the impact on the development process. As
we notice in a recent work [48], this suggests that requirements at different
degrees of abstractions may need different treatments.
More specifically, patterns to check presence of plurals, as well as also
and but conjunctions, may need to be applied for low-level requirements,
while they do not need to be used for high-level ones.
7.2.3 Validation criteria count
Considering the Large-scale Study – 1st and 2nd Iterations, we saw that a
large part of the false positive cases encountered in the Large-scale Study
– 1st Iteration could be associated with a weaker validation performed by
VE2. In fact he was not focused on linguistic defects, but more on severe
conceptual defects, also given his in-depth knowledge of the project. For this
reason, the results obtained in terms of precision were extremely poor. When
changing criteria, pR varied from 5.81% to 77.37% (Section 6.4). Hence, to
perform an appropriate validation of rule-based NLP patterns, it is advisable
to start from an annotated dataset that has been defined knowing the classes
of defects that will be checked by the patterns, and specifically stating that
the focus is on linguistic defects. Otherwise, the results might be misleading.
This observation might appear counter-intuitive, since we suggest to adapt
human operators to tools. However, when dealing with the complexity of
NL, we argue that the adaptation between humans and NLP tools should be
bi-directional.
7.3 NLP is only a part of the answer
In our large-scale study, several false negative cases occurred, which can
hardly be detected with NLP. These are examples of conceptual defects that
require a human with knowledge of the domain and of the specific project.
94 Lessons learned and future research issues
In recent years, NLP technologies have seen radical progress [64]. Linguis-
tic tasks at the semantic level such as question-answering became possible.
However, the pragmatic nature of ambiguity [53], and the contextual knowl-
edge needed to understand a requirements document, make the problem
of automatic defect detection in requirements hardly solvable with current
technologies. Therefore, NLP represents only a part of the answer to defect
detection, while the other part is represented by human analysts with do-
main expertise. It should also be considered that relying on a tool for defect
detection may also change company practices, in that a VE may rely too
faithfully on the tool’s output. This reasonable hypothesis requires further
empirical investigation, but its potential implications should be considered
when introducing an automated tool to support practices that are normally
manually conducted.
7.4 Statistical NLP vs Lexical techniques
Our patterns make use of POS tagging and shallow parsing, which are statis-
tical techniques that can hamper the objective of 100% recall [11]. However,
in Section 6.2, we showed that 100% recall was achieved for those patterns
that used these techniques, while it was not achieved for the pattern adopted
for vague terms, which uses a lexical based approach. Hence, we argue that
the argument in favour of a “dumb” lexical-based defect detection approach
instead of an approach that leverages statistics-based techniques [11] should
be partially revised. If one wants to use lexical-based detection approaches,
then one should use only defect indicators belonging to closed word classes
(e.g., pronouns, conjunctions). Instead, if one uses open word classes (e.g.,
adjective, adverbs), the problems are not different from those that might
emerge with statistical techniques. As statistical techniques may fail, also
lists of dangerous adjectives and adverbs may fail, because they might not
include words that were not considered until they appear in the requirements
(e.g., the word some, as noted in Section 6.2, or the words jolty and uneven,
as noted in Section 6.6).
7.5 Implication for practice and future research
In this section we draw conclusions presenting the implication for practice
and introducing some future research directions.
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7.5.1 Implication for practice
Overall, the experience was considered extremely useful by the company. In
particular, VEs say that, after studying the literature on defect identifica-
tion, and implementing the patterns, also their way of judging requirements
defects became stricter. This is also one of the reasons why requirements
previously marked as accepted, were afterwards rejected in the former anno-
tation process. This implies that, while on the one hand tools have to be
adapted to company practices, also company practices can be modified by
tools. In our study, we also observed that an increase in the performance can
be obtained by incrementally tuning the patterns based both on the defects
encountered in practice, and through the inclusion of other defect-detection
criteria from the research literature – in particular, the SREE dictionaries.
Therefore, regardless of the NLP technologies used to detect defects, tech-
nologies need to be adapted to the specific language of the company, to be
fruitfully used.
It should also be observed that, based on the lessons learned from the
current study, one of the participating VEs is now involved in a mentoring
program within the company, oriented to teach requirements engineers how
to write linguistically clear requirements. The idea is that requirements
engineers should be aware of linguistic defects, so that the work of VEs can
focus on conceptual ones. In this sense, we argue that, by working with
NLP techniques for defect detection, one can have an effect also in terms
of organizational learning. Furthermore the company has recently begun
to use NLP techniques to detect defects also in the application condition
of their products. Another relevant implication for practice concerns the
complementary role of NLP techniques, and human analysis. We observed
that part of the conceptual defects present in the requirements could not
be detected with the patterns, but some ignored linguistic defects could be
identified by the patterns. This suggests that, although human analysts
cannot be replaced, tools can help them to perform a better job.
7.5.2 Ongoing and future research
After this experience some new research directions emerged and are presented
below.
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Dataset extension
In order to achieve more general results there is the need of increasing the
dataset dimension and especially its variety. In particular, it is necessary to
collect a dataset composed of requirements coming from different levels and
different projects. Alstom expressed the willingness to continue the collab-
oration providing other requirements from four different levels of software
development life cycle with increasing detail level (see Section 1.3):
• Software Requirements Specification: 58 requirements;
• Software Architecture Specification: 231 requirements;
• Software Design Specification: 439 requirements;
• Software Component Specification: 574 requirements.
The defects annotation process is in progress.
The experimentations on this dataset would allow to understand to which
extent the NLP patterns have to be tuned to analyze requirements at differ-
ent levels of abstractions, and to understand which patterns are appropriate
for which level.
Furthermore we want to extend our dataset using requirements docu-
ments from different domains in order to assess to which extent the adap-
tation of NLP patterns to the language of a company can lead to improved
results in terms of defect detection accuracy. We are looking forward to use
other repositories, for example the one introduced in [52]. A major problem
in conducting a solid experimental analysis on these further data is their
annotation by independent reviewers, which is scarcely available.
Language and cost: research directions
It would be of interest to study to which extent language errors – a defect
not considered here, but mentioned in [12] – may impact on the quality
of the requirements. The VEs noticed that large part of the requirements
considered were not expressed in correct English, since they were written by
Italian editors, who tended to use Italian syntactic constructions. However,
apparently, these language errors did not have an impact on the subsequent
phases of the process, since the readers of the requirements were also Italian.
Another interesting research direction regards the evaluation of the cost
of using NLP techniques for defect detection, compared to the cost of manual
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review. Cost-based evaluation approaches suitable for our context have been
recently discussed by [10].
Machine learning techniques for NLP
We agree that the usage of NLP rule-based approach for defect detection in
NL requirements has numerous advantages, in particular: (a) it is relatively
easy to define rules and to apply them; (b) this approach provides hints on
the localization of detected defects.
We also agree that this approach suffers from one major drawback: it
lacks the capability to generalize (i.e., the rules need to be tailored for each
specific company, project, requirements level, etc.).
It would be of interest to evaluate the feasibility of machine learning
techniques for NLP defect detection and, in case this approach results to be
feasibile, to compare its performance with the rule-based one. As emerged
from our early stages investigations in this area [45] it is particularly impor-
tant to have a various and balanced dataset. The required dataset dimension
depends on the selected algorithm. We performed a preliminary test in this
direction using the approach described below:
• each requirement was vectorized by extracting bag-of-word (BoW) fea-
tures, performing the following steps:
1. tokenization of text using white spaces as separators;
2. removal of the punctuation and the words of length 1;
3. removal of morphological and inflexional endings from the words
by running the Porter stemming algorithm [95];
4. removal of all the stop words1;
5. creation of the histogram of the unigrams and bigrams2.
• we randomly split the dataset into a training set containing the 90% of
the requirements and a test set containing the remaining 10%. Since
the dataset is unbalanced (i.e., the defective requirements are only the
4.8%) we stratified the splitting so that train and test sets have the
same proportion of defective requirements;
1Stop words are the most common words in a language and are usually stored in lists.
2A unigram is the occurrence of one word, while a bigram denotes the occurrence of
two words in sequence.
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• we trained a linear SVM on the training set.
We measured a precision of 6.9% and a recall of 87.2% on the test set,
thus obtaining quantitative results close to the ones discussed in the main
matter. The major drawback of this simple early-stages sperimentation is
that a pure classifier – SVM in this case – is unable to provide hints on
the defect localization. This drawback may be overcome applying different
machine learning algorithms (e.g., multi-instance learning, meta learning,
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) [54, 98, 108, 30]).
Chapter 8
Public and private transport
integration model with STPN
8.1 Introduction
By the year 2030, urban mobility will have changed due to sociodemographic
evolution, urbanization, increase of the energy costs, implementation of en-
vironmental regulations, and further diffusion of Information and Communi-
cation Technology (ICT) applications. The demand for public and collective
modes of transport will increase considerably. Part of the answer will come
from the public transport that will evolve as an integrated combination of
buses, cars, metros, tramways and trains [41, 1]. In general, right-of-way
(ROW) is the defining characteristic of public transportation modes and we
can list three ROW types:
1. Exclusive: Transit vehicles operate on fully separated and physically
protected ROW. Tunnels, elevated structures, or at-grade tracks are
such examples. This ROW type offers very high capacity, speed, reli-
ability and safety. All heavy rail transit systems, like the Metrorail of
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, belong to this
category.
2. Semi-Exclusive: Transit ways are longitudinally separated from other
traffic, such as private vehicles and pedestrians. Light rail transit
(LRT) systems, like the Florence tramway in Italy, are mostly built
according to this ROW type.
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3. Fully-Shared: Transit vehicles share ROW with other traffic, for ex-
amples buses, taxi and cars. This ROW type requires the least in-
frastructure investment, but operations are relatively unreliable due to
roadway congestion.
Exclusive ROW need major investment, thus often semi-exclusive or
fully-shared modes are chosen. The drawback of this choice is that the
different transportation modalities may end in a conflict due to physical
constraints concerned with the urban structure itself. For example, this is
the case of an intersection between a public road and a tramway right-of-way,
where traffic lights priority given to trams may trigger road congestion, while
an intense car traffic can impact on trams’ performance. These situations
can be anticipated and avoided by accurately modeling and analyzing the
possible congestion events. Typically, modeling tools provide simulation fa-
cilities, by which various scenarios can be played to understand the response
of the intersection to different traffic loads. Simulation techniques are used
to support early verification of design choices, but can analyze a limited, yet
high, number of different scenarios, and encounter difficulties in the evalu-
ation of rare events. Only modeling techniques and tools that support the
analysis of the complete space of possible scenarios are able to find out such
rare events [20, 14].
In this chapter, we present an analytical approach to model and evalu-
ate a critical intersection for the Florence tramway, where frequent traffic
blocks used to happen. This work has been funded by Fondazione Cassa di
Risparmio di Firenze, with the kind help of GEST1, the company running
the Florence tramway, in providing important data on which to base the
study.
8.2 Analysis of a conflict between public and
private transport in Florence
Figure 8.1 shows the route of line 1, which has been put in service in 2010 and
links Santa Maria Novella central station to Scandicci (Florence suburbs).
This line has overall good performance, with trams running regularly from
the end of the line in Scandicci to almost the other end in the city center,
but there is a consistent source of delay just a few meters short of the last
1https://www.ratpdev.com/en/references/italy-florence-tramway
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Figure 8.1: Map of tram route from Villa Costanza (Scandicci) to Alamanni-
Stazione (Santa Maria Novella station). The route is 7720 meters long with
14 tram stops.
scheduled stop, near Santa Maria Novella train station [32]. The root cause
for these issues is the Diacceto-Alamanni intersection, where both via Iacopo
da Diacceto, a street with dedicated tracks for tramways, and via Luigi
Alamanni, a street for private transport, head to Santa Maria Novella train
station.2. An aerial view of this intersection is shown in Figure 8.2. The
darker stripe that crosses the tracks represents the (unidirectional) private
traffic flow from Alamanni street that is the source of the analyzed conflict.
Taking this intersection as a case study, we exploit the ORIS tool to
evaluate the probability of a traffic block, leveraging regenerative transient
analysis based on the method of stochastic state classes to analyze a model
of the intersection specified through Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPNs).
Note that ORIS supports the analysis of models with multiple concurrent
temporal parameters associated with a general (i.e., non-exponential) distri-
bution. In particular, the model of the Diacceto Alamanni intersection in-
2Actually, the construction works of the new tramway lines (due to be opened soon)
have consistently changed the geometry of the Diacceto-Alamanni intersection, partially
removing the car traffic. Anyway, the analysis presented in this work refers to a relevant
scenario, typical of intersections between a public road and a tramway right-of-way, which
will occur more frequently in Florence as new tramway lines will be built.
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Figure 8.2: Aerial view of the Diacceto-Alamanni intersection.
cludes temporal parameters associated with a deterministic value (e.g., tram
interleaving period), a uniform distribution (e.g., tram delay time), and an
exponential distribution (e.g., private vehicles arrival rate). The reported
experience shows that the frequency of tram rides impacts on the road con-
gestion, and hence compensating measures (such as sychronizing the passage
of trams in opposite directions on the road crossing) should be considered.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 8.3 sum-
marises related works. Section 8.4 provides a short introduction to STPNs,
the method of stochastic state classes, and the ORIS tool. Section 8.5
presents the realized model and Section 8.6 the obtained results. Finally,
Section 8.7 concludes the chapter.
8.3 Related Works
Earliest research on integrated control for traffic management at network
level can be traced back to the 1970s. The first railway timetables were
planned based on the experience and knowledge of dispatchers in resolving
train conflicts [65]. This manual scheduling practice proved its low efficiency
with the increase of traffic congestion and exacerbated train delays.
An integrated policy for priority signals at intersections is required, given
that trams operate in a semi-exclusive ROW environment. In the literature,
we can find two different streams of studies: the first aiming at optimiz-
ing tram schedules without considering their effects on other traffic flows;
the second aiming at manipulating the tram schedule so that trams always
clear the intersection during green phases, thus reducing influences on other
traffic flows. In [105], the tradeoffs between tram travel times and roadway
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traffic delays are explored. Literature counts several works applying differ-
ent simulation techniques. Microscopic models, i.e., models in which each
vehicle is modeled by itself as a particle, can be divided according to the
representation of road structure in greater detail. In the continuous road
model group, a base structure of road space is modeled as a continuous one
dimensional (1D) link. The behavior of car agents is often implemented by
applying car-following theories [92, 109, 125]. In the cell-type road model
group, road space is discretized by homogeneous cells in which the behav-
ior of car agents is expressed using transition rules such as cellar automata
[72, 112]. In a queuing model group, road networks are modeled as queuing
networks [57, 2]. Most commercial microscopic traffic simulators employ the
continuous road model. In addition, several researchers have proposed sim-
ulation frameworks for mixed traffic of two or more models. For example,
Yang et al. [119] proposed a framework for pedestrian road crossing behavior
in Chinese cities in which they determined the criterion used by pedestrians
to decide whether to start crossing a road after considering vehicle flows.
Meanwhile, Zeng et al. [123] modeled pedestrian-vehicles interactions at
crosswalks in order to minimize pedestrian-vehicle collisions.
Dobler and La¨mmel [40] integrated multi-modal simulation modules to
the existing framework of MATSim, a large scale traffic simulation framework
based on the queuing model [29]. Their integration approach was based
on locally replacing simple queue structures with continuous 2D space at
sections with higher traffic flows. The behavior rules of agents in the 2D space
are based on the social force model (SFM). Krajzewicz et al. [77] introduced
pedestrian and bicycle agent models into SUMO, which is a widely used
traffic simulator belonging to the continuous road model group [78]. Finally
Fujii et al. [55] introduced an agent-based framework for mixed-traffic of
cars, pedestrians and trams by using the simulator MATES [121].
8.4 Background
In this section, we provide some background on STPNs (Sect. 8.4.1), the
method of stochastic state classes (Sect. 8.4.2), and the ORIS tool (Sect. 8.4.3).
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8.4.1 Stochastic Time Petri Nets
An STPN is a tuple 〈P, T,A−, A+, A·,m0, F,W,E,U〉 where: P is the set of
places; T is the set of transitions; A− ⊆ P ×T , A+ ⊆ T ×P and A· ⊆ P ×T
are the sets of precondition, postcondition, and inhibitor arcs, respectively:
m0 : P → N is the initial marking; F : T → [0, 1][EFTt,LFTt] associates
each transition t with a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) F (t) :
[EFTt, LFTt] → [0, 1], where EFTt ∈ Q≥0 and LFTt ∈ Q≥0 ∪ {∞} are
the earliest and latest firing time, respectively; W : T → R>0 associates
each transition with a weight; E and U associate each transition t with
an enabling function E(t) : NP → {true, false} and an update function
U(t) : NP → NP , which associate each marking with a boolean value and a
new marking, respectively.
A place p is an input, an output, or an inhibitor place for a transition t
if 〈p, t〉 ∈ A−, 〈t, p〉 ∈ A+, and 〈p, t〉 ∈ A·, respectively. A transition t is
immediate (IMM) if EFTt = LFTt = 0 and timed otherwise; a timed tran-
sition t is exponential (EXP) if Ft(x) = 1 − e−λx over [0,∞] with λ ∈ R>0,
and general (GEN) otherwise; a general transition t is deterministic (DET)
if EFTt = LFTt > 0 and distributed otherwise; for each distributed transi-
tion t, we assume that Ft is the integral function of a Probability Density
Function (PDF) ft, i.e., Ft(x) =
∫ x
0
ft(y)dy. IMM, EXP, GEN, and DET
transitions are represented by thick white, thick gray, thick black, or thin
black bars, respectively.
The state of an STPN is a pair 〈m, τ〉, where m is a marking and τ : T →
R≥0 associates each transition with a time-to-fire. A transition is enabled by
a marking if each of its input places contains at least one token, none of its
inhibitor places contains any token, and its enabling function evaluates to
true; an enabled transition t is firable in a state if its time-to-fire is equal to
zero. The next transition t to fire in a state s = 〈m, τ〉 is selected among the
set of firable transitions Tf,s with probability W (t)/
∑
ti∈Tf,sW (ti). When t
fires, s is replaced with s′ = 〈m′, τ ′〉, where:
• m′ is derived from m by: removing a token from each input place of
t, which yields an intermediate marking mtmp; adding a token to each
output place of t, which yields a second intermediate marking m′tmp;
and, applying the update function U(t) to m′tmp;
• τ ′ is derived from τ by: i) reducing the time-to-fire of each persis-
tent transition (i.e., enabled by m, mtmp and m
′) by the time elapsed
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in s; ii) sampling the time-to-fire of each newly-enabled transition tn
(i.e., enabled by m′ but not by mtmp) according to Ftn ; and, iii) re-
moving the time-to-fire of each disabled transition (i.e., enabled by m
but not by m′).
8.4.2 The method of stochastic state classes
The method of stochastic state classes [114, 66] permits the analysis of
STPNs with multiple concurrent GEN transitions. Given a sequence of fir-
ings, a stochastic state class encodes the marking and the joint PDF of the
times-to-fire of the enabled transitions and the absolute elapsed time τage.
Starting from an initial stochastic state class, the transient tree of stochastic
state classes that can be reached within a time tmax is enumerated, enabling
derivation of continuous-time transient probabilities of markings (forward
transient analysis), i.e., pm(t) := P{M(t) = m} ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax, ∀ m ∈ M,
where M(t) is the marking process describing the marking M(t) of an STPN
for each time t ≥ 0 and M is the set of reachable markings.
If the STPN always reaches within a bounded number of firings a regen-
eration, i.e., a state satisfying the Markov condition, its marking process is a
Markov Regenerative Process (MRP) [31], and its analysis can be performed
enumerating stochastic state classes between any two regenerations. This
results in a set of trees that permit to compute a local and a global kernel
characterizing the MRP behavior, enabling evaluation of transient marking
probabilities through the numerical solution of Markov renewal equations
(regenerative transient analysis). Trees also permit to compute conditional
probabilities of the Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) embedded at re-
generations and the expected time spent in any marking after each occur-
rence of any regeneration [84], supporting derivation of steady-state marking
probabilities according to the Markov renewal theory (regenerative steady-
state analysis).
While stochastic state classes support quantitative evaluation of an STPN
model, the set Ω of behaviors of the STPN can be identified with simpler and
more consolidated means through non-deterministic analysis of the underly-
ing TPN model. In this case, the state space is covered through the method
of state classes [113, 39], each made of a marking and a joint support for τage
and the times-to-fire of the enabled transitions. In this approach, enumera-
tion of state classes starting from an initial marking provides a representa-
tion for the continuous set of executions of an STPN, enabling verification
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of qualitative properties of the model, e.g., guarantee, with certainty, that
a marking cannot be reached within a given time bound (non-deterministic
transient analysis).
8.4.3 ORIS overview
ORIS [16]3 is a software tool for qualitative verification and quantitative eval-
uation of reactive timed systems. ORIS supports modeling and evaluation
of stochastic systems governed by timers (e.g., interleaving or service times,
arrival rate, timeouts) with general probability density functions (PDFs).
The tool adopts Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPNs) as a graphical formal-
ism to specify stochastic systems, and it efficiently implements the method of
stochastic state classes, including regenerative transient, regenerative steady-
state and non-deterministic analysis.
The software architecture of ORIS decouples the graphical editor from
the underlying analysis engines. Given the many variants of Petri net fea-
tures, ORIS was developed with extensibility in mind: new features can be
defined by implementing specific interfaces, so that they can be introduced
in the graphical editor and made available to the analysis engines. In turn,
analysis engines implement a specific interface that allows them to cooperate
with the graphical interface, i.e., to collect analysis options from the user,
to start/stop analysis runs, to record and display analysis logs, and to show
time series and tabular results. The available analysis engines include:
Non-deterministic Analysis, to produce a compact representation of the
dense set of timed states that can be reached by the model. Non-deterministic
analysis based on the theory of Difference Bound Matrix (DBM) supports
the identification of the boundaries of the space of feasible timed behaviors
[19]. The state space is displayed as a directed graph, where edges represent
transition firings while nodes are state classes [113] comprising a marking
and a DBM zone of timer values. This analysis is useful to debug STPNs
models and ensure that their state space M is finite.
Transient and Regenerative Analysis, to compute transient probabili-
ties in Generalized Semi-Markov Processes (GSMPs) and Markov Regener-
ative Processes (MRPs), respectively. These methods evaluate trees where
edges are labeled with transitions and their firing probabilities, while nodes
are stochastic state classes [66] comprising a marking, the PDF of timers,
3ORIS is available for download at the webpage https://www.oris-tool.org/
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and their support (a DBM zone). For a given time limit T , the enumeration
proceeds until the tree covers the transition firings of the STPN by time T
with probability greater than 1 − , where  > 0 is an error term. While
standard transient analysis enumerates a single, very large tree of events,
regenerative analysis avoids the enumeration of repeated subtrees rooted in
the same regeneration point (where all general timers are reset or have been
enabled for a deterministic time). A time step ∆t is used to select equis-
paced time points where transient probabilities are evaluated (directly or by
solving Markov renewal equations).
Regenerative Steady-State Analysis, to compute steady-state proba-
bilities in MRPs (and thus Semi-Markov Processes (SMPs) and Continuous
Time Markov Chains (CTMCs)) with irreducible state space. This method
uses trees of stochastic state classes between regeneration points to com-
pute steady-state probabilities of markings: expected sojourn times in each
tree are combined with the steady-state probability of regenerations at their
roots [84]. As for transient analysis, this method can be applied to STPNs
allowing multiple general timers enabled in each state.
Transient Analysis under Enabling Restriction, to compute transient
probabilities in MRPs that allow at most one general transition enabled in
each state [58].
ORIS engines support instantaneous (transient or steady-state) and cu-
mulative (transient) rewards. A reward is a real-valued function of markings
r : M → R that is evaluated by substituting place names with the num-
ber of contained tokens in order to compute the instantaneous expected
reward Ir(t) =
∑
i∈M r(i)pi(t) at each time t, its steady-state value Ir =
limt→∞ Ir(t) =
∑
i∈M r(i)pi or its cumulative value over time Cr(t) =∫ t
0
Ir(t)dt. In addition, the user can specify a stop condition, i.e., a Boolean
predicate on markings such as (p0 == 1)&&(p1 == 1), that is used to halt
the STPN. This feature can be used to compute first-passage probabilities
[66] or reach-avoid objectives equivalent to bounded until operators [90].
8.5 Diacceto-Alamanni: an STPN model
In this section, we describe the STPN model of the Diacceto-Alamanni in-
tersection. Figure 8.3 shows the model which is composed of the following
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two submodels:
• tramway submodel (blue box);
• private traffic submodel (red box).
8.5.1 Tramway submodel
The portion of the tramway submodel in the dotted blue box represents the
direction from Santa Maria Novella train station (Alamanni-Stazione), while
the one in the dashed blue box represents the opposite direction. GEST pro-
vided the interleaving period of trams, which is equal to 220 s; transition
period, which models tram departures, fires a new token periodically and is
enabled with continuity until place KO receives a token. Places p0 and p1
represent a tramway departing from Alamanni-Stazione and Villa Costanza,
respectively. Transitions delayFromSmn and delayFromScndc represent the
delays cumulated by the two trams, respectively; note that 120 s is an up-
per bound on the maximum delay observed in the available data set and,
given that data are few and their distribution is unknown, this parameter is
modeled using a uniform distribution [9].
When the tramway is approaching the intersection, dedicated wayside
systems (i.e., two loops placed under the railway tracks) are activated (places
Loop01 .001 .1 and Loop01 .001 .2 ) and the corresponding traffic lights are
set to red (places setRedFromSmn and setRedFromScnd). The traffic lights
are in fact set to red 5 s before the arrival of the tram at the intersec-
tion; this parameter has been provided by GEST and is modeled by the
DET transitions crosslightAnticipationSmn and crosslightAnticipationScnd.
Places crossingFromSmn and crossingFromScnd represent the arrival of the
tram at the intersection, while transitions leavingFromSmn and leavingFrom-
Scndc account for the time needed to free the intersection. Specifically, the
minimum and the maximum time needed to free the intersection are set equal
to 6 s and 14 s, respectively, based on the fact that in the data set provided
by GEST this temporal parameter has mean value nearly equal to 10 s and a
standard deviation approximately equal to 4 s. Also in this case, given that
available data are few, this parameters is modeled by a uniform distribution
over the interval [6, 14] s [9].
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Figure 8.3: Intersection model. The tramway submodel is highlighted by the
blue box, the private traffic queue submodel is highlighted by the red one.
Transitions associated with an enabling function are marked by a label “e”.
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8.5.2 Private transport submodel
We model private traffic as a birth-death process with three levels of traf-
fic congestion: specifically, places carQueue0 , carQueue1 , and carQueue2
model the condition of low, moderate, and high volume of traffic, respec-
tively. Since we lack data on car traffic in Florence, we assume that the
average traffic density is approximatively 1000 cars per hour, which is a typ-
ical value for a high traffic flow on a single lane [89], and we consider the
case that the arrival/departure of two cars increases/decreases the traffic
congestion level, respectively, and that the time needed to occupy the inter-
section is nearly half the time needed to leave it. According to this, the EXP
transitions t7 and t8 have rate equal to 0.14 s−1, while the EXP transitions
t9 and t10 have rate equal to 0.067 s−1.
Intuitively, the number of cars in the queue increases when the private
traffic light is set to red and decreases otherwise. In order to model this be-
havior, transitions t7 and t8 are associated with an enabling function that
evaluates to true when at least one token is present in place setRedFromSmn
or in place setRedFromScnd (i.e., setRedFromSmn+setRedFromScnd>0 ). Con-
versely, transitions t9 and t10 are associated with an enabling function that
evaluates to true when no token is present in places setRedFromSmn and
setRedFromScnd (i.e., setRedFromSmn+setRedFromScnd==0 ).
8.5.3 Interaction between the tramway submodel and
the private transport submodel
Road congestion may cause cars to stand for a while on the tracks after the
private traffic light has turned to red, thus blocking trams. Place yellow
models the private traffic light set to yellow, while place KO actually models
the case that a tram ride is blocked by private vehicles on the lane. When
place KO receives a token, transition stopAll becomes enabled (given that it
is associated with an enabling function KO>0 ) and fires, depositing a token
in place inhibitAll. This finally disables transitions period, leavingFromSmn,
and leavingFromScndc, due the inhibitor arcs from KO to each of these
transitions.
Transitions t13 through t19 model the possibility that a tram ride is
blocked by private vehicles stopping on the tracks. If the traffic congestion
level is low (i.e., carQueue0 > 0), the tram runs regularly and transition
t19 is enabled, so that no token is deposited in place KO. If traffic con-
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gestion increases to a moderate level (carQueue1 > 0) or to a high level
(carQueue2 > 0), transition t13 or transition t14 becomes enabled and
fires, respectively. In the former case (p3 > 0), transitions t15 and t17 fire
with probability 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, given that they have weight equal
to 30 and 70, respectively; in the latter case, transitions t16 and t18 fire with
probability 0.4 and 0.6, respectively, given that they have weight equal to 40
and 60, respectively. In doing so, the probability of a traffic block is 0.3 and
0.4 in the case of moderate and high traffic congestion, respectively. These
parameters have been estimated from tram delays observed in the data set
provided by GEST.
8.6 Analysis and Results
In this section, we report the results obtained from the analysis of the model
of Sect. 8.5. In all the experiments, we performed regenerative transient
analysis of the model through the ORIS tool using the following parameters:
• Time limit T = 7200 s (corresponding to 2 h);
• Time step ∆t = 20 s.
• Error  = 0.01;
The first experiment has been performed with average traffic density equal
to 1000 cars per hour (i.e., the EXP transitions t7 and t8 have rate equal to
0.14 s−1, and the EXP transitions t9 and t10 have rate equal to 0.067 s−1, as
shown in Figure 8.3) and crosslight anticipation equal to 5 s (i.e., the value of
the DET transitions crosslightAnticipationSmn and crosslightAnticipation-
Scnd is 5 s, as also shown in Figure 8.3). Figure 8.4 shows the probability
of the private traffic queue status in a time interval of 2 h, obtained com-
puting the instantaneous rewards “carQueue0 > 0”, “carQueue1 > 0”, and
“carQueue2 > 0”. As we can see, the queue status tends to saturation quite
rapidly.
Figure 8.5 shows the KO probability for different values of the crosslight
anticipation parameter, obtained computing the instantaneous reward “KO >
0”. We observe that the probability of reaching the KO state increases ev-
ery 220 s for all the displayed curves, due to periodic tram departures. We
also note that the probability of reaching the KO state increases when the
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Figure 8.4: Transient probability of the traffic queue status.
crosslight anticipation is higher: intuitively, when the anticipation time in-
creases, the time during which private traffic should flow away from the
intersection decreases, thus degrading the queue status and consequently
increasing the KO probability.
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Figure 8.5: Transient probability of the KO state for different values of the
crosslight anticipation parameter.
Finally, Figure 8.6 shows the KO probability (obtained computing the
instantaneous reward “KO > 0”) for different values of the private traffic
density. The probability of reaching the KO state increases when the traffic
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Figure 8.6: Transient probability of the KO state for different values of traffic
density.
density is higher and reaches 0.7 in less than half an hour with extremely
congested private traffic (i.e., 1500 cars per hour), while the same value
is reached in more than a hour with moderately congested private traffic
(i.e., 500 cars per hour).
We also argue that, for the planning of both tram timetables and traffic
light timings, it is important to consider the correlation between the time
of red signal, the time of green signal, and the tram headway, pointing out
the need of an integrated management of the different transport systems in
order to have a more robust and higher quality service. Furthermore, a more
detailed analysis is needed to accurately model the behavior of private traffic
during the day.
8.7 Implication for practice and future research
In this section we draw conclusions presenting the implication for practice
and introducing some ongoing and future research directions.
8.7.1 Implication for practice
Modeling and analysis of complex intersections for the integration of private
and public transport supports the evaluation of the perceived availability of
public transport and the identification of robust traffic light plans and tram
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timetables. In this chapter, we presented an analytical approach to model
and evaluate a critical intersection for the Florence tramway. Specifically,
we used the ORIS tool to evaluate the probability of a traffic block, leverag-
ing regenerative transient analysis based on the method of stochastic state
classes to analyze a model of the intersection specified through Stochastic
Time Petri Nets (STPNs). The analysis results showed a correlation between
the frequency of tram rides, the traffic light plan, and the status of the queue
of private vehicles, pointing out that the frequency of tram rides impacts on
the road congestion. Therefore, compensating measures should be consid-
ered, such as synchronizing the passage of trams in opposite directions on
the road crossing.
8.7.2 Ongoing and future research
Within the context of modeling techniques to optimize the integration of
public and private traffic, our work will go towards the following directions:
• analyze other road/tramway intersections, also considering the new
tramway lines that will be opened in Florence, so as to to compare
differences and similarities and generalize the modeling methodology;
• improve the scalability of the approach by combining numerical solu-
tion of the tramway submodel through the ORIS tool with analytical
evaluation of the traffic congestion level, which could permit to model
private traffic more accurately (e.g., considering a larger number of
congestion levels) without incurring in the state space explosion prob-
lem;
• evaluate to which extent the behavior of passengers and pedestrians
as well as the weather conditions perturb the tramway performance,
including them in the model of the road/tramway intersection [88];
• compare the results obtained with analytical approach with the ones
obtained by microsimulation techniques.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
The work presented in this thesis is the result of a research activity aimed at
investigating on methods to improve the product lifecycle cost-effectiveness
in the context of railway domain. In particular it focused on different as-
pects: a main topic on system verification and a side project in performance
evaluation.
For what concerns system verification the focus was on the activity of
requirement review performed by the Verification Engineers in order to de-
tect defects in requirements expressed in natural language. This activity
is time consuming and error prone and we investigated to which extent an
automatic tool could help the Verification Engineers in this task.
In Chapters ranging from 3 to 7 is presented a case study experience
performed in collaboration with Alstom and ISTI-CNR. We first identified
a set of typical defects classes and, for each class, a Verification Engineer
of the company implemented a set of defect-detection patterns by means
of the GATE tool for text processing. A pilot study on 241 requirements
is presented, as well as a large-scale study on 1866 requirements. After a
refinement of the patterns, a precision of 83.16% and a recall of 85.39%
are obtained. Recall can be increased by using term-based defect detection
tools such as SREE [111], although at the cost of a lower precision. This
experience led to two publications [100, 51].
This is one of the first works in which defect detection NLP techniques are
applied on a very large set of industrial requirements annotated by domain
experts. We contribute with a comparison between traditional manual tech-
niques used in industry for requirements analysis, and analysis performed
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with NLP. Our experience shows that several discrepancies can be observed
between the two approaches. The analysis of the discrepancies offers hints to
improve the capabilities of NLP techniques with company specific solutions,
and suggests that also company practices need to be modified to effectively
exploit NLP tools.
For what concerns system performance evaluation we focused on the
problem of interaction and integration between public and private traffic
in the actual and future cities. This activity was funded by the Fondazione
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and focused on the analysis of a critical in-
tersection for the Florence tramway. Specifically, we used the ORIS tool to
evaluate the probability of a traffic block, leveraging regenerative transient
analysis based on the method of stochastic state classes to analyze a model
of the intersection specified through Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPNs).
The experience showed that an analytical analysis is possible on the sta-
tistical behaviors of undesired events often not considered in the simulation
scenarios.
The future research directions related to the two topics have been detailed
in Section 7.5.2 and Section 8.7.2 and here we observe that in both the
areas there is the need of capturing and understanding the “human factor”
influence; in one case it is related to the way human beings communicate
(the natural language), in the other it is related to what they use to behave
(when travelling by public transport or driving a vehicle). With the increase
of transport systems complexity, high quality and performance demand, thus
new challenges are introduced, but all of them need to consider the ‘human
factor” playing behind as it fills the gap between the ideal situation and the
reality.
Appendix A
Appendix A: Stochastic
Discrete Time Petri Nets
Petri Nets are a family of formalisms used in the modeling and analysis
of synchronous, asynchronous and distributed systems. There are countless
variations and extensions, that allow to deal with both qualitative and quan-
titative aspects of systems; some formalisms take into account time and are
purely nondeterministic, whereas some others enable a stochastic character-
ization of the system.
A.1 Petri Nets
One of the simplest models is the original Petri Net (PN ), introduced in the
seminal work [93]. In the following Petri Nets are presented with modern
notations.
A.1.1 Syntax
A Petri Net (PN ) is a tuple:
PN = 〈P ;T ;A−;A+;A•;w−;w+;w•;M〉
• P and T are disjoint sets of places and transitions.
• A− ⊆ P × T is a set of precondition arcs.
• A+ ⊆ T × P is a set of postcondition arcs.
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• A• ⊆ P × T is a set of inhibitor arcs.
• w− : A− → N associates each precondition arc with a multiplicity.
• w− : A+ → N and w− : A• → N are defined analogously.
• M : P → N is a marking, and associates each place with a number of
tokens.
Petri Nets are essentially biparted graphs in which one of the two node
types, the place, is associated with a natural number. A graphical represen-
tation of a Petri Net is given in Figure A.1; places are represented as circles
and transitions as black rectangles; preconditions are arrows going from a
place to a transition; postconditions are arrows going from a transition to
a place; an inhibitor arc is a line going from a place to a transition, termi-
nated by a small black circle; the marking is represented by decorating every
place with the corresponding number of tokens; weights are natural numbers
written near the arc they refer to, and when no multiplicity is specified it is
assumed to be 1.
t
t
p
p
p
1
2
3
1
2
Figure A.1: A simple Petri Net.
A place p is called an input place for a transition t if (p, t) ∈ A−; it
is called an output place if (t, p) ∈ A+; it is called an inhibitor place if
(p, t) ∈ A•. It is a good idea, in order to simplify notations, to extend the
domain of w− and w• to the entire set P × T , and the domain of w+ to the
entire set T × P ; these extensions are denoted with the symbol δ:
δ− : P × T → N, δ−(p, t) =
{
w−((p, t)) if (p, t) ∈ A−
0 otherwise
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δ+ : T × P → N, δ+(t, p) =
{
w+((t, p)) if (t, p) ∈ A+
0 otherwise
δ• : P × T → N, δ•(p, t) =
{
w•((p, t)) if (p, t) ∈ A•
+∞ otherwise
A.1.2 Semantics
The state of a PN consists of its marking:
s = 〈M〉
The state evolves according to two rules.
Enabling
A transition t is enabled if and only if, for each of its precondition arcs
(p, t) ∈ A− it is true that M(p) ≥ w−((p, t)), and for each of its inhibitor
arcs (p, t) ∈ A• it is true that M(p) < w•((p, t)). This is equivalent to
requiring that δ•((p, t)) > M(p) ≥ δ−(p, t) for any place p.
Firing
An enabled transition t can fire, leading to a transition relation
t→ between
states such that s = 〈M〉 t→ s′ = 〈M ′〉 if and only if, for each place p:
M ′(p) = M(p)− δ−(p, t) + δ+(t, p)
In other words, when a transition fires, tokens are removed from its input
places and are added to its output places. The amount of tokens is specified
by the multiplicities δ− and δ+.
A.1.3 State-Space generation
Given an initial state So, the succession relation
t→ identifies a set of reach-
able states S and a transition system TS = 〈So,S, t→〉. Derivation of the
TS requires algorithms for the symbolic firing of transitions; for example
methods using relational product that can be efficiently implemented.
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A.2 Discrete-Time Stochastic Petri Nets
This section describes a simplified version of the Petri Net formalism first
introduced in [17].
A.2.1 Syntax
A Discrete-Time Stochastic Petri Net (dtSPN ) is a tuple:
dtSPN = 〈P ;T ;A−;A+;A•;w−;w+;w•;M ;D; C〉
• P and T are disjoint sets of places and transitions.
• A− ⊆ P × T is a set of precondition arcs.
• A+ ⊆ T × P is a set of postcondition arcs.
• A• ⊆ P × T is a set of inhibitor arcs.
• w− : A− → N associates each precondition arc with a multiplicity.
• w− : A+ → N and w− : A• → N are defined analogously.
• M : P → N is a marking, and associates each place with a number of
tokens.
• D associates each transition t with a static probability mass function
Dt. The extrema of the support of Dt are the static earliest and latest
firing time and are denoted EFT s(t) and LFT s(t) respectively.
• C : T → N is a competitiveness function.
The graphical representation of a dtSPN is very similar to the one of
a PN; the only additional elements are annotations for probability mass
functions and competitiveness. An example of dtSPN is shown in Figure A.2.
The family of Petri Net formalisms is quite homogeneous and it is often
the case that syntactical differences can be handled by decorating the basic
PN syntax with extended elments. Decorating the semantics, however, is
way harder; but can be a very efficient way to enable code reuse and favor
the development of multi-formalism environments. An example of such a
framework which is actively maintained is [22].
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Figure A.2: A simple Discrete-Time Stochastic Petri Net. Note that when
enabled t2 fires deterministically in zero time, t3 fires deterministically in 3
time units and t1 has a nondeterministic firing time; when only the interval
[EFTt, LFTt] is specified for a transition t, the static distribution Dt is
assumed to be uniform, hence transition t1 could execute in 1, 2, or 3 time
units with probability 1/3.
A.2.2 Semantics
The state of a dtSPN consists of a marking M and a vector ~ttf of integer
times to fire, one for each transition t, denoted ttft:
s = 〈M, ~ttf〉
The state evolves according to four rules.
Enabling
A transition t is enabled if and only if, for each of its precondition arcs
(p, t) ∈ A− it is true that M(p) ≥ w−((p, t)), and for each of its inhibitor
arcs (p, t) ∈ A• it is true that M(p) < w•((p, t)). This is equivalent to
requiring that δ•((p, t)) > M(p) ≥ δ−(p, t) for any place p.
Firability
A transition t is fireable if it is enabled and its time to fire ttft is equal to
0. The set of fireable transitions is called the attempting set. Note that for
a disabled transition t the time to fire is irrelevant, and could be thought as
to be +∞.
122 Appendix A: Stochastic Discrete Time Petri Nets
Step selection
If the attempting set is empty, time advances by one tick. Otherwise a firing
set is derived from the attempting set through repetitive stochastic selection;
until the attempting set is not empty, any of its transitions t∗ is randomly
selected with probability Prob{t∗}, it is removed from the attempting set,
and it is added to the firing set if and only if it is not in conflict with the firing
set. A set T ′ ⊆ T of transitions is nonconflicting if ∑t∈T ′ δ−(p, t) ≤ M(p)
for any place p, otherwise it is conflicting. This definition is adapted from
[18], but is compatible with the semantics of [17]. The probability of selecting
t∗ depends on its competitiveness and on those of the other transitions still
in the attempting set:
Prob{t∗} = C(t∗)∑
t∈Attempting set
C(t)
Note that, since the repetitive stochastic selection stops only when the at-
tempting set is empty, the firing set that is derived is effectively maximal :
two transitions that can fire simultaneously will do so.
Progress
If time advances the marking remain unchanged and the time to fire of any
enabled transition is reduced by one time unit. Otherwise a firing set φ
fires, and the marking is updated for each place p by taking into account the
preconditions and postconditions of all the transitions in the firing set:
M ′(p) = M(p)−
∑
t∈φ
δ−(p, t) +
∑
t∈φ
δ+(t, p)
In doing so, a temporary marking Mtmp is also derived, which accounts for
decrementing token counts on input places:
Mtmp(p) = M(p)−
∑
t∈φ
δ−(p, t)
M(p) = Mtmp +
∑
t∈φ
δ+(t, p)
Transition which are enabled in M ′ are either persistent or newly enabled :
• A transition t is newly enabled if it is enabled in M ′ but not in Mtmp
or if t ∈ φ;
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• A transition t is persistent if it is enabled in both M ′ and in Mtmp.
A persistent transition t has its time to fire ttft unchanged; a newly
enabled transition t has its time to fire ttft resampled nondeterministically
according to the probability mass function Dt. Time to fire is irrelevant for
transitions not enabled in M , because they will be resampled as soon as they
are newly enabled.
This semantics describes a transition relation
ev,µ→ , where µ is a probability
measure and ev is either a time advancement event, also called a tick event,
or a firing event. For the time advancement event µ = 1, while for the firing
event µ depends on both the result of repetitive stochastic selection as well
as on the determination of the times to fire resampled for newly enabled
transitions.
As an example, consider the dtSPN of Figure A.2; in this model a firing
event could happen after one, two or three ticks; if it happens after one or
two, then it involves only t1, that is, φ = {t1}; after three ticks, t1 and t2
must fire simultaneously, that is, φ = {t1, t2}.
A.2.3 Maximal step semantics
The expression maximum firing strategy was introduced in [18] and denotes
an execution semantics for Petri Nets such that, intuitively, all transitions
that can fire compete to do so, and eventually some of them execute si-
multaneously; in [17] the terminology maximal step semantics is used to
denote a similar behavior, with an additional stochastic characterization via
stochastic repetitive selection. Throughout the rest of the dissertation, the
expression “maximal step semantics” is used.
Maximal step semantics is inherently more complex than interleaving se-
mantics, in which transitions fire one at a time. Under interleaving seman-
tics, if in state s a set E ⊆ T of transitions are enabled, then there are exactly
|E| possible firing events that can lead to other states, one for each enabled
transition. Under the maximal step semantics instead, any subset φ ⊆ E can
lead to a corresponding firing event; the only restriction is that subsets must
be maximal, so that if φ1 ⊆ φ2 is a set derived through repetitive stochastic
selection, then φ2 certainly is not. However this restriction does not prevent
the number of possible firing sets from growing exponentially in the worse
case.
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A.2.4 Stochastic states
The evolution of a dtSPN is regarded as a discrete time stochastic process.
The states of this process are called stochastic states to distinguish them
from the states introduced in Section A.2.2. A stochastic state consists in
a marking M and a vector ~P of probability mass functions for the times to
fire of the transitions enabled by M .
s = 〈M, ~P〉
The evolution across stochastic states is described through a succession re-
lation
ev,µ⇒ where ev is an event and µ a measure of probability. ev could be
tick, defer or a firing set φ denoting a firing event. Given two stochastic
states S = 〈M, ~P〉 and S′ = 〈M ′, ~P ′〉, S ev,µ⇒ S′ if and only if the following
property holds: if the marking is M and the vector of times to fire is a ran-
dom variable distributed according to ~P, then ev is a possible next event,
which occurs with probability µ, and which leads to a new marking M ′ and
a new vector of times to fire distributed according to ~P ′.
In addition to tick and firing events, in stochastic state-space genera-
tion an additional fictious defer event is considered. defer accounts for the
instantaneous choice that no fireable transition will fire before the advance-
ment of time. With this convention, the set of outgoing events for a given
state can take one of the following two forms:
• a single tick event;
• several firing events, one for each possible firing set, plus an optional
defer event.
A.2.5 Stochastic State-Space generation
Given an initial stochastic state So, the succession relation
ev,µ⇒ identifies a
set of reachable stochastic states S and a timed stochastic transition system
STS = 〈So,S, ev,µ⇒ 〉. Derivation of the STS requires algorithms for the
detection of the outcoming events from a stochastic state, for the calculus of
their probability, and for the derivation of successor stochastic states.
Tick event
Tick is an outcoming event for S = 〈M, ~P〉 if and only if Pt(0) = 0 for every
transition t enabled under marking M or, in other words, if EFTt > 0. In
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the transition from S to S′ = 〈M ′, ~P ′〉 through a tick event, marking is not
changed, while time to fire of enabled transitions is updated in the following
way:
P ′t(n) = Pt(n+ 1) (A.1)
The probability of the µ = tick event is:
Ptick(S) = 1 (A.2)
Defer event
Defer is an outcoming event for S if and only if Pt(0) < 1 for each enabled
transition and Pto(0) > 0 for at least one enabled transition to or, in other
words, if LFTt > 0 and EFTto = 0. In the transition from S to S
′ = 〈M ′, ~P ′〉
through a defer event, marking is not changed, while time to fire of enabled
transitions is updated by conditioning the time to fire to being higher than
zero:
P ′t(n) =
{
0 it t is enabled in S and n = 0
Pt(n)
1−Pt(0) it t is enabled in S and n 6= 0
(A.3)
The probability of the µ = defer event is:
Pdefer(S) =
∏
t∈fireable(S)
(1− Pt(0)) =
∏
t∈Enabled(S)
(1− Pt(0)) (A.4)
where Enabled(S) is the set of transitions that are enabled in state S
and fireable(S) ⊆ Enabled(S) is the subset of those transitions for which
Pt(0) 6= 0.
Firing event
The firing of a set φ = {tn}Hn=1 is an outcoming event for S if and only
if: φ contains only enabled and nonconflicting transitions, every transition
t ∈ φ can fire before time advances and, and every enabled transition tnc /∈ φ
which is not conflicting with φ can be delayed, i.e.
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Pt(0) > 0 ∀t ∈ φ (A.5)
Ptnc(0) < 1 ∀tnc /∈ φ, enabled and not conflicting with φ. (A.6)
In the transition from S to S′ = 〈M ′, ~P ′〉 through the firing of set φ,
marking is changed according to the marking update rule described in Sec-
tion A.2.2, while the components of vector ~P are updated differently for
transitions that are persistent or newly enabled after the firing of φ: newly
enabling involves a resampling of the time to fire, while the time to fire of
persistent transitions is conditioned to be higher than zero:
P ′t(n) =

Dt(n) if t is newly enabled
0 it t is enabled in S and n = 0
Pt(n)
1−Pt(0) it t is enabled in S and n 6= 0
(A.7)
The probability of the µ = φ event is:
Pφ(S) =
∑
σ∈Att(S)
Pφ|σ · Pσ(S) (A.8)
where Att(S) is the set of attempting sets that are feasible in S, Pσ(S)
is the probability that σ is the attempting set for a ~ttf distributed like ~P,
and Pφ|σ is the probability that φ is the firing set given that the attempting
set is σ. Due to the independence of times to fire of different transition,
Pσ(S) =
∏
ti∈σ
Pti(0)
∏
tj∈fireable(S)\σ
(1− Ptij (0)) (A.9)
where fireable(S) \ σ denotes the set of fireable transitions that are not
included in the attempting set. Pφ|σ can be seen as a sum over different
possible orderings:
Pφ|σ =
∑
seq∈Perm(σ)
Pφ|seq · Pseq|σ (A.10)
where Perm(σ) is the set of permutations of the elements of σ and seq
denotes any such permutations. Pseq|σ is the probability that the transitions
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in σ are selected in the order implied by seq, and can be expressed as
Pseq|σ =
|seq|∏
i=1
C(tseqi)
|seq|∑
h=i
C(tseqh)
(A.11)
and Pφ|seq is 1 if and only if every transition t ∈ φ appears in seq before
any other transition which has conflict with t itself, and is 0 otherwise.
A.3 Stochastic Preemptive Time Petri Nets
The formalism of dtSPNs is a simplified version of the one described in [17],
which the authors called Stochastic Preemptive Time Petri Nets (spTPNs).
These are a discrete and stochastic variant of continuous time Preemptive
Time Petri Nets [21]. The main feature of preemptive Petri Nets is the
concept of preemptable resource; any transition t is associated with a marking
dependent priority, Prio(t,M), and a set Req(t) of requested resources. An
enabled transition to is progressing if and only if every resource in Req(to)
is not in the Req(t1) of any other enabled transition t1 with higher priority;
transitions that are enabled but not progressing are said to be suspended.
Only progressing transitions can be fireable and be part of the attempting
set. Intuitively, a suspended transition is similar to a disabled one, because
it cannot fire, but when it becomes progressing again its time to fire is not
resampled, in contrast to disabled transitions which become newly enabled.
Preemptive time Petri Nets are a very powerful formalism for the analysis
of real-time systems. An example of spTPNs is shown in Figure A.3. The
reader should refer to [17] and [21] for additional information.
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Figure A.3: A simple Stochastic Preemptive Time Petri Net
.
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Publications
This research activity has led to the following publications.
International Journals
1. Alessio Ferrari, Gloria Gori. Benedetta Rosadini, Jacopo Trotta, Stefano
Bacherini, Alessandro Fantechi, Stefania Gnesi “Detecting requirements de-
fects with NLP patterns: an industrial experience in the railway domain”,
Empirical Software Engineering, vol. in press, 2018 [DOI:10.1007/s10664-
018-9596-7]
International Conferences and Workshops
1. Benedetta Rosadini, Alessio Ferrari, Gloria Gori, Alessandro Fantechi, Ste-
fania Gnesi, Jacopo Trotta, Stefano Bacherini “Using NLP to Detect Re-
quirements Defects: An Industrial Experience in the Railway Domain”, in
Proceedings of the 23rd International Working Conference on Requirements
Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ’17) , Essen (Ger-
many), 2017
2. Laura Carnevali, Alessandro Fantechi, Gloria Gori, Enrico Vicario “Us-
ing NLP to Detect Requirements Defects: An Industrial Experience in the
Railway Domain”, submitted and accepted in Proceedings of the 12th Inter-
national Conference on Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Com-
munication Systems, Grenoble (France), 2018
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